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1 INTRODUCTION 
Stories of outstanding entrepreneurial success, of which Google and Apple are only two of the most popular 
examples (NVCA, 2014), have directed the attention of economists and policymakers around the world 
towards venture capital as an instrument for economic policy. The creation and promotion of a large risk 
capital market has since long been identified as a policy instrument for employment generation (EU 
Commission, 1998) and is nowadays part of the EUROPE 2020 strategy of the European Commission (EU 
Commission, 2010). To name a concrete example, the European Investment Bank provides through 
intermediaries venture capital to small and medium-sized firms in the industries of life science or 
information and communication technology (EIB, 2015). 
1.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Although there is no unique common definition of venture capital, it is widely seen as a form of private 
equity (OECD, 2014). Providers of venture capital, or venture capitalists, are financial intermediaries that 
invest mainly on behalf of institutional financiers into young and innovative firms with a highly risky 
business model (Hellmann, 2000). These firms have otherwise only limited or no access to the capital 
market (Sahlman, 1990). The supply of venture capital (henceforth VC) to this kind of firms becomes 
possible through the specialization of the venture capitalists in the technology industries they invest. 
Moreover, venture capitalists exploit various techniques to limit the consequences of information 
asymmetries. Most importantly, VC thereby overcomes problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
In the course of these measures, they create access to finance for young firms and generate positive 
externalities. An example of such externalities are knowledge spillovers that occur through the interaction 
of venture capitalists, portfolio firms and other agents involved. The beneficial effects work at the early 
stages of a young firm from its foundation up to later development and the expansion of the young firm. 
Consequently, innovation and economic activity is enhanced and VC is beneficial to the economy as a 
whole. 
Assessing the effects of VC helps determining whether VC is an efficient instrument for the economic 
policy or a waste of effort. Predominantly in the United States, VC investment spawned a number of 
globally leading companies in highly innovative industries. Microsoft, Intel and Medtronic could be added 
to the two examples mentioned already above. For policymakers the success of these companies is one of 
the most popular arguments to endorse the promotion of the venture capital industry in the economic policy 
agenda. However, it is by far not sufficient to capture the effect of VC in the entirety. Historically, the 
development of the industry in Europe has been much slower than in the United States, which led to a gap 
in the relative significance of VC regarding both economic regions (Bottazzi & Da Rin, 2002, Hege, 
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Palomino, Schwienbacher, 2009, OECD, 2013). As a percentage of GDP, VC reaches not even 0.04 % in 
most European countries, whereas it represents 0.17 % of the US-American GDP in 2013 (OECD, 2013).1 
1.2 AIM AND SCOPE 
The aim of the present thesis is to analyse whether the VC industry has a positive effect on the generation 
of economic activity, its enhancement and the abatement of failure of entrepreneurial projects. Theoretical 
models show that VC matters for business creation and innovation based growth (Keuschnigg, 2004, 
Michelacci and Suarez, 2004). Previous empirical research suggests that VC has a positive effect on 
macroeconomic outcomes, such as aggregate income, firm births, employment and patents (e.g. Kortum, 
& Lerner, 2000, Samila, & Sorenson, 2010, 2011, Popov and Roosenboom, 2013). Only a single aspect of 
the effects of VC is analysed by most of the previous research. Furthermore, a large part of the scientific 
work in the field deals with the effects of VC at the firm level, in particularly the linkage of VC and 
innovation. Thereby, the macroeconomic dimension cannot be captured. 
This study aims to expand the empirical body of research on VC by taking into account the multiplier 
effect of VC and analyses the linkage of VC with a more ample scope than previous studies.2 It is hence 
possible to identify which of the effects of VC is most pronounced and to derive the main function of VC 
in the economy. In order to gain these insights, the effects of VC on three different measures, that is firm 
births, employment in newly born firms and survival rate of young firms, are analysed and compared. The 
thesis aims to contribute to the literature by answering the question: How does the VC industry affect 
business dynamics? Does it help the most for the generation of economic activity, for its enhancement or 
for the abatement of failures of young firms? In order to assess these questions, the thesis applies a cross-
country approach and considers measures of the size of the VC industry in the United States, 21 European 
countries and the aggregated Baltic countries during 2004 -2012. Not in scope of the study is the quality 
of a VC industry, as represented for example by the incorporated human capital in the VC funds or by the 
quality of the network between funds. 
1.3 DISPOSITION 
Part 2 presents previous research dealing with the linkage of VC with economic outcomes, such as 
innovation, economic growth, and productivity and, most relevant to the present study, business dynamics 
and employment. A theoretical description of how VC works, as already shortly outlined above, is given 
                                                     
1 The crisis of 2008 led to a sharp decrease of VC investment globally. Whereas the United States’ VC industry 
quickly recovered, Europe’s VC industry had not reached pre-crisis investment by the year 2013 (OECD, 2014). 
2 By multiplier effect, the effect of VC on the economy as a whole is meant. Thus, not only the direct effect of VC, 
e. g. the provision of capital to founders and thereby on the rate of business creation in an economy, but also the 
indirect effect through networking and spill-overs also on other agents involved in the investment process is taken 
into account. The concept of the multiplier effect is described more in detail in part 3. 
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more in detail in part 3. Moreover, this part derives the expected effects on business dynamics. The data 
used for the empirical analysis is explained in part 4 and the empirical methodology is developed in part 
5. Part 6 provides the results of the regressions and the checks of robustness. Finally, part 7 concludes by 
discussing the results. 
2 PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON THE ROLE OF VC FOR THE ECONOMY 
Investment in the form of VC has been the subject in many studies of the recent economic literature and 
analysed from a variety of angles. Da Rin, Hellmann and Puri (2011) present in their review different 
strands of recent academic work dealing with VC. One of the largest strands in the field discusses the 
question why there is VC and reaches back to the widely seen basic motivation for VC (e.g. Amit, Brander 
& Zott, 1998, Gompers & Lerner, 2001). Capital provisions to young firms in the form of VC represents 
an instrument of financial intermediation that can overcome the problems of information asymmetry 
arising in particular in highly innovative industries (Magri, 2009). Although founders of young firms in 
these industries are mostly equipped by valuable technological expertise, they often lack entrepreneurial 
experience, which amplifies the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard (Keuschnigg, 2004). 
Screening of investment candidates, syndication with other capital providers, monitoring of portfolio firms, 
staging of capital and the use of specialized compensation systems are some of the important mechanisms 
by which the market of VC is functioning (Sahlman, 1990). Kaplan and Strömberg, (2001) give an 
overview of empirical research dealing with contracting, screening and monitoring. The theoretical 
background of VC and the reasons why VC adds value to firms and to the economy as a whole is discussed 
more in detail in part 3. The remainder of this chapter concentrates on research that shows how these 
fundamental principles are related to aggregate outcomes and assesses the macroeconomic dimension of 
VC empirically. 
It has already been mentioned that the share of VC in the GDP of Europe’s economies is much lower than 
in the United States. Before summarising the literature dealing with the effects of VC, the variety of 
determinants of VC supply brought forward in the literature is introduced shortly. Jeng and Wells (2000) 
put forward a broad range of aspects: labour market rigidities, regulations of financial reporting and 
governmental contributions to the VC market. Initial public offerings (IPOs) as the “most attractive 
mechanism” (Jeng & Wells, 2000, p. 254) of liquidation after a VC investment, have a large impact 
especially on the supply of late stage VC, whereas regulatory policies concerning capital influence the 
provision of VC in general. Some scholars argue that the taxation of capital gains is an important factor 
for the size of the VC (e.g. Gompers & Lerner, 1999). On the demand side, higher output and larger 
expenditures for R&D lead to more fundraising and to a larger supply of VC. In addition, special interest 
is given to the importance of private pension funds in a country and their restrictiveness in the investment 
selection, as pension funds are often the most important capital sources for VC funds (Jeng & Wells, 2000, 
Gompers & Lerner, 1999, 2001). Schertler (2007) focusses on another aspect that affects the amount of 
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VC supply. According to her, innovation and knowledge capital are key factors in the evolution of VC 
industries. As a complement to the supply of VC in general, governmental suppliers of VC have attracted 
the interest of numerous researchers (for instance, see Brander, Egan, & Hellmann, 2010, Bulevska, 2014, 
Leleux & Surlemont, 2003). 
What impact VC has at large, for instance, on innovation, economic growth, and employment has been 
discussed in the literature predominantly from an empirical point of view and to a smaller extent 
theoretically (for reviews see Parhankangas, 2012 or Wright, Gilligan, and Amess, 2009). From a 
theoretical perspective, Michelacci and Suarez (2004) and Keuschnigg (2004) show how the VC industry 
affects the economy as a whole. As these two studies and other theoretical analyses are used in the 
theoretical framework described in part 3, the next section proceeds with the review of empirical research. 
As there is a quite extensive amount of studies looking on the linkage of VC and innovation the review of 
existing literature in the field starts with an overview of the research in this field. Before turning to the core 
interest of the present study, the linkage between VC and business dynamics, an outline of adjacent 
research related to VC and its various macroeconomic effects on a firm, industry and country level is given. 
2.1 VC AND INNOVATION 
One of the most discussed fields of interest is the relationship of VC and innovation. Table 1 gives a 
certainly incomplete but as far as possible representative overview of empirical research on this linkage. 
2.1.1 Firm level 
At the firm level, there is some controversy about the direction of causality between VC and innovation. 
The question addressed by some studies is whether it only works from VC to innovation (“VC first” 
hypothesis as suggested by Arqué-Castells, 2012, Bertoni, Croce & D’Adda, 2010, Dushnitsky & Lenox, 
2005). Others argue that it works exclusively in the other way (“innovation first” hypothesis as suggested 
by Caselli, Gatti & Perrini, 2009, Engel & Keilbach, 2007, Peneder, 2010, Schertler, 2007) or in both ways 
(Baum & Silvermann, 2004, Chemmanur, Krishnan & Nandy, 2011). Several studies examine patenting 
as an indicator of innovation. Bertoni et al. (2010) conduct a firm level analysis and show that patenting 
activity increases with VC investment. This result remains significant when they control for other factors 
such as existing patent stock, technological or economic education as well as for accounting variables. The 
conclusion is that VC promotes the activity in R&D at the firm level. Highlighting another function of VC, 
some studies stress out that VC helps in the commercialization of innovation rather than in its generation 
(Baum & Silverman, 2004, Engel & Keilbach, 2007). Similarly, Caselli et al. (2009) support the view, that 
VC increase sales by improving management and commercial processes. Beside of patenting, total factor 
productivity (TFP) or product novelty (e.g. Peneder, 2010) are used as an indicator of innovation. 
Chemmanur et al. (2011) concentrate solely on the effect of VC on TFP growth. In their study on the firm 
level, they find a positive effect of VC on the efficiency of firms. They discuss how this positive influence 
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is achieved. It could be, that venture capitalist choose the most efficient firms by their screening activity 
or that the provided post-investment services by the venture capitalists, such as monitoring boosts the 
efficiency of the backed companies. After testing these two hypotheses by various methods, they argue 
that both mechanisms are at work. 
2.1.2 Industry and country level 
Another strand of the literature examines the linkage at a macroeconomic level, considering industries or 
countries as the unit of observation. In a study by Kortum and Lerner (2000) about US manufacturing 
industries, the authors assume an innovation production function with the factors VC and business R&D 
expenditures. They show that more investment in the form of VC leads to a higher innovation output as 
measured by patents. In comparison to R&D, the impact of a dollar invested through VC is more than three 
times larger. The stronger positive effect of VC persists when they apply a different way of measuring VC 
investment by regressing on the number of firms that received VC. Furthermore, they check for 
technological shifts, as a factor that could affect both patenting as well as VC and R&D. Using instrumental 
variables, the positive impact of VC remains robust. Building on this study, Hirukawa and Ueda (2008) 
extend the analysis in terms of years covered and in terms of dependent variables considered. Besides 
patents, they estimate the effect of VC on the growth of TFP and labour productivity. For the former, the 
effect is positive but not significant, whereas for the latter, they find a positive and significant effect. For 
the result on labour productivity, they clarify that it is via factor substitution, that VC comes into effect. 
Concerning patents, they provide evidence that VC matters for the patenting activity, as Kortum and Lerner 
(2000) suggested before. 
Similarly, Tang and Chyi (2008) endorse this view and support the hypothesis of a positive effect on TFP. 
According to them, knowledge spillovers via venture capitalists are responsible for the higher TFP rates. 
In a later study, Hirukawa and Ueda (2011) further explore the linkage by focussing on the direction of the 
linkage between VC and innovation. Using again a panel of industry specific data on VC, patenting and 
TFP in the United States, they promote the “Innovation-first hypothesis” (Hirukawa, & Ueda, 2011, p. 21), 
given that they find stronger support for the direction of innovation as represented by TFP influencing VC 
and not the other way round. Concerning patenting, the direction remains unclear. However, the linkage 
between VC and patents is, in contradiction to their earlier results, negative. Popov and Roosenboom 
(2012) conduct for the first time a cross-country cross-industry study of the effect of VC on innovation. In 
their approach, they consider manufacturing industries in 21 European countries from 1991 to 2005. As 
previous approaches, they use the number of patents as the dependent variable, VC and R&D expenditures 
as independent variables. Conformingly with studies at the firm level (e.g. Engel & Keilbach, 2007), they 
support the view that VC rather helps in professionalizing the commercial activities of young and 
innovative firms instead of generating innovative output. Hence, they only find a weak linkage between 
VC and innovation as measured by patents. 
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Only little research has been conducted that deals with the linkage of VC and innovation at a country level. 
Schertler (2007) shows that more knowledge capital in a country attracts and promotes VC investments. 
Thus, she supports rather the “innovation first” hypothesis. In contrast to this finding, the study by Samila 
and Sorenson (2010) stress out, that both public funds and private venture capital contribute in a 
complementary way to the innovative output in a country. After checking for endogeneity, this finding 
remains robust. Faria and Barbosa (2014) specify a dynamic panel and use patent applications to measure 
innovation. In their model, they regress the ratio of patent applications to the country’s GDP on the lagged 
ratio, VC and some control variables, such as the R&D expenditures to GDP ratio. Another particularity 
of the study is that they distinguish between VC in early stages from VC in a later stage of the young firm. 
Their conclusion is that especially later stage VC has an impact on innovation, by promoting its 
commercialization instead of its generation. 
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TABLE 1: PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON VC AND INNOVATION 
Author(s) Coverage Main findings 
Arqué-Castells 
(2012) 
Sample of firms in Spain, 
2003 – 2005 
 VC investment leads to an increase in patenting 
 The effect is robust when accounting for the selection of innovative 
firms by venture capitalists 
Baum and Silverman 
(2004) 
Sample of biotechnology 
firms in Canada, 1991 – 
2000 
 Venture capitalists pick “winners” with promising technological 
concept (patents increase the propensity to receive VC) 
 VC does not lead to a higher patenting activity 
 Added value by venture capitalists leads to professionalization in the 
commercial development 
Bertoni,et al. (2010) Sample of new technology 
based firms in Italy, 1994 
– 2003 
 VC leads to a higher activity of patenting 
 Controlling for other determinants changes the results only slightly 
Caselli et al. (2009) Sample of firms in Italy, 
1995 - 2004 
 No positive impact of VC on innovation 
 Improvements from VC are achieved rather in the managerial 
practice and in the commercial operations of the VC backed firms 
Chemmanur et al. 
(2011) 
Firm level in the United 
States, 1972 – 2000 
Higher efficiency in terms of TFP of VC backed firms due to selection 
(pre-investment) and to value adding services (post-investment) 
Dushnitsky and 
Lenox (2005) 
Sample of US public 
firms, 1969 – 1999 
Corporate VC has a positive impact on patenting output 
Engel and Keilbach 
(2007) 
Firm level in Germany, 
1995 – 1998 
 Venture capitalists tend to select firms that hold patents 
 patenting does not differ after VC provision in comparison to firms 
without VC backing 
Faria and Barbosa 
(2014) 
Country level in Europe, 
2000 – 2009 
 Later stage VC has positive impact on patent applications 
 Check for endogeneity → VC first 
Hirukawa and Ueda 
(2008) 
Industry level in the 
United States, 1968 – 
2001 
 VC has a stronger effect on patents than R&D 
 No support for an effect of VC on TFP 
 positive effect on labour productivity via factor substitutions 
Hirukawa and Ueda 
(2011) 
Industry level in the 
United States, 1968 – 
2001 
 Negative impact of VC on patents 
 Negative impact of VC on TFP growth 
 Linkage of TFP and VC argues for Innovation first 
Kortum and Lerner 
(2000) 
Industry level in the 
United States, 1965 - 1992 
 VC has a larger impact on innovation as measured by patent grants 
than R&D expenditure 
  Results hold after check for causality with instrumental variables 
Peneder (2010) Sample of Austrian firms, 
1996 - 2005 
 VC has a positive impact on innovation but is not causal for higher 
innovative output 
 The positive effect stems from the firm selection by the venture 
capitalist 
Popov and 
Roosenboom (2012) 
Industry level in Europe, 
1991 – 2005 
 VC accounts for 9.7 % of industrial innovation as measured by 
patent grants, but the effect is not significant 
 Lower potency of VC versus R&D in Europe than in the US 
Samila and Sorenson 
(2010) 
Regional level in the 
United States, 1993 - 2002 
VC fosters innovation by acting as an “catalyst for commercialization” 
Schertler (2007) Country level in Europe, 
1991 – 2001 
 “Knowledge capital” has a positive impact on VC 
 Innovation first 
Tang and Chyi 
(2008) 
Industry level in Taiwan, 
1984 – 2002 
 VC has a positive impact on aggregate total productivity growth 
 Effect through knowledge spillovers via venture capitalists 
8 
2.2 VC, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PRODUCTIVITY 
Besides the linkage of VC and innovative output, scholars have analysed other measures for the effects of 
VC. Table 2 summarizes studies that look on the effects of private equity in general or VC in particular on 
various macroeconomic outcomes. 
2.2.1 Firm level 
At the firm level, the empirical research compares mainly the growth of sales in VC backed firms to firms 
without VC backing. Several studies support the hypothesis that VC has a positive impact on sales 
(Alemany & Martí, 2005, Casselli et al., 2009, Peneder, 2010, Puri & Zarutskie, 2012). However Bürgel, 
Fier, Licht and Murray (2000) find that this effect is not significant. In contrast to the findings on innovative 
output, Peneder (2010) supports the view that VC is causal for the growth of sales after checking for 
robustness with a two-stage matching procedure. Alemany and Martí (2005) look on a broader range of 
economic impacts of VC in a sample of Spanish firms and apply two estimation techniques. On the one 
hand side they match VC-backed companies with a control group and on the other hand side they conduct 
a panel estimation. Besides sales growth, they analyse the gross margin, total and intangible assets and find 
that VC has a positive effect on all these economic measures. 
The study by Puri and Zarutskie (2012) differs from the aforementioned studies, as the authors do not use 
a sample of firms but the universe of employer firms in the United States. They conduct an analysis of VC-
backed firms with a matched and a non-matched sample. From both cases, the evidence suggests that VC 
has a positive impact on sales growth. However, VC-backed firms are in average less profitable than the 
matched and the non-matched group of firms, which indicates that the large scale of the investee matters 
more than profitability for venture capitalists. Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002) describe the development of VC 
in Europe and contrast it to the evolution of VC in the United States, where VC has a much longer history. 
From the analysis of a sample of European VC backed firms, they conclude that VC does not necessarily 
lead to a better performance of the firms backed when they are offered publicly or in terms of measures 
recorded after the IPO. According to them, one of the reasons for this finding is that the European VC 
industry is still young and therefore lacks experience. However, in their approach, they do not take into 
account spillover effects and positive externalities on other companies, which could lead to an 
underestimation of the impact of VC. 
2.2.2 Country level 
Only a few studies looked on the macroeconomic impact of VC in terms of aggregate measures at the 
country level. A report published by the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA, 2013) summarizes 
methodological approaches of research on private equity in Europe and gives an overview of statistics and 
analyses that look on the impact of private equity on innovation, productivity and competitiveness in 
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Europe. The conclusion of the report states a positive impact of private equity on these macroeconomic 
outcomes. Only one study examining the effect of VC on economic growth could be found. Zhang, Zhang, 
Wuang and Huang (2013) assume an economic growth model with endogenized VC. They conduct a time 
series analysis of the Israeli VC industry, which is one of the largest and most successful worldwide (Zhang 
et al., 2013). They show that there is a significant positive effect of VC both when there is technological 
progress as represented by R&D expenditures included in the model and when it is not. The contribution 
of VC amounts to about 3 % in terms of its elasticity to GDP. 
TABLE 2: PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON PRIVATE EQUITY, VC AND VARIOUS ECONOMIC MEASURES 
Author(s) Coverage Main findings 
Alemany and Martí 
(2005) 
Sample of firms in Spain, 
1989 - 1998 
Sales, gross margin, total assets, intangible assets and corporate taxes 
grow faster in VC backed firms 
Bottazzi and Da Rin 
(2002) 
Sample of European firms, 
1996 - 2000 
 VC has no impact on the time-to-listing of a firm, but increases the 
amount of funds raised at IPO 
 After IPO, VC backed companies do not generate more sales and 
more employment than companies that are not backed by VC 
Caselli et al. (2009) Sample of firms in Italy, 
1995 - 2004 
Positive impact of VC on the growth of sales 
Bürgel et al. (2000) Sample of High-tech firms 
in Germany and the UK, 
1997 
No significant effect of VC on sales growth 
EVCA (2013) Meta-study based on 
research mostly on 
Europe, up to 2012 
 Private equity leads to higher productivity in the investee firms and 
thus to a raise in the competitiveness of the company as a whole 
 Private equity promotes new business and job creation 
Peneder (2010) Sample of Austrian firms, 
1996 - 2005 
Sales grow faster in VC backed firms 
Puri and Zarutskie 
(2012) 
Firm level in the United 
States, 1981 - 2005 
 VC-backed firms show a faster growth of sales and of payrolls than 
equivalent firms without VC 
 However, VC-backed firms are less profitable 
Zhang et al. (2013) Country study of Israel, 
1995 - 2008 
 Time series analysis of an economic growth model with endogenized 
VC 
 Positive and significant impact of VC on economic growth 
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2.3 VC AND BUSINESS DYNAMICS 
Finally, and most interestingly for the present study, some scholars analysed in which way business 
dynamics and employment growth are linked to VC. 
2.3.1 Firm level 
Some studies look on the effect of VC at the firm level. Considering Germany and the United Kingdom, 
Bürgel et al. (2000) do not support the view, that involvement of VC in start-ups leads to a significant 
increase in employment. In contrast to this, Audretsch and Lehmann (2004) observe significant 
employment growth in VC-backed firms during the year before initial public offering (IPO) and during the 
year after IPO when comparing to a control group of firms without VC backing. As already mentioned 
above for other measures, Alemany and Martí (2005) also show for employment that VC has a positive 
significant effect and Engel and Keilbach (2007) corroborate the hypothesis that receiving VC leads to a 
significantly higher employment growth rate. In regard to US-American evidence, Puri and Zarutskie 
(2012) show in their study that VC-backed firms not only show generally a higher average employment 
than a peer group of non-VC-backed firms, but also exhibit higher growth rates of employment. According 
to them, the ratio of VC backed firms amounts to only 0.05 to 0.16 % of the total firm population whereas 
the share of the employment in VC-backed companies is at least 2.7 % and reaches up to 7.3 % during the 
period in question. The study by Davila, Foster and Gupta (2003) underpins this finding by describing 
employment patterns of VC backed firms. They point out that receiving VC has a signalling effect and 
increases employment growth after the investment. Regarding firm survival, when comparing failure rates 
of firms that received VC to firms that did not receive VC, Puri and Zarutskie (2012) find that the former 
showed a much lower rate than the later (34.1 % versus 66.3 % as of 2005). 
Empirical research looking on firm survival in the context of VC is particularly scarce. The study by 
Manigart, Byens and Van Hyve (2002) is the only example found that addresses this topic explicitly. They 
argue that it is rather the type of the investor that matters for the survival rate of young firms than the the 
fact that a firm receives VC. The rationale behind this is that the objective of investors differs by its type. 
The aim of private-sector VC funds is to maximize the returns of the investment at the liquidation of the 
investee, whereas governmental investors aim for a maximization of the social payoff, e.g. in terms of 
employment generation or innovation output. Thus, they find that firms receiving capital from two of the 
large governmental VC provider in Belgium have the highest chances to survive. 
2.3.2 Industry and country level 
Zucker, Darby and Brewer (1998) were one of the earliest to conduct an empirical study that examines the 
impact of regional existence of VC on the birth of firms in the Biotech industry in comparison to other 
factors. With inclusion of human capital in the regression, they find a negative impact of VC. Belke, Fehn 
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and Foster-McGregor (2003) conduct a study that examines the effect of VC on employment. By 
controlling for seasonal effects via GDP and for a number of institutional variables of the labour market, 
the authors find a significant and positive impact of VC investment on employment. In order to exclude 
endogeneity they use the second lag of the dependent variable as an instrument for VC. 
Furthermore, the creation of new firms were analysed in the studies by Samila and Sorenson (2010, 2011) 
and by Popov and Roosenboom (2013). The former look on the effects of the number of companies backed 
and the amounts of VC invested at the regional level in the US. The results of the panel analysis shows 
that VC has a positive significant effect on the creation of new firms, on employment and on the aggregate 
income (Samila & Sorenson, 2011). More specifically, the main mechanism behind this effect of VC is 
that VC fosters the development of entrepreneurial activity and is a “catalyst for commercialization” 
(Samila & Sorenson, 2010, p. 1358). One drawback of this approach is that the entire effect of VC cannot 
be captured when looking on regional levels. There might be considerable interregional effects, as, for 
instance a firm birth in a region fosters the employment or the aggregate income in another region. 
Furthermore, to address the question of the causality direction, they use instrumental variables. Thereby, 
VC supply continues to be positive and significant for the variables of firm births and aggregate income. 
The study of Popov and Roosenboom (2013) supports these findings after examining a country industry 
panel of 21 European countries by a number of different estimation approaches. Depending on the method 
applied, they conclude that the ratio of new firms in an industry increases between 3 % and 19 % when the 
amount of investment is raised by the factor of 7.2, which represents the difference between the set of 
industries where VC investment is the strongest and the weakest. 
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TABLE 3: PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON VC, EMPLOYMENT AND BUSINESS DYNAMICS 
Author(s) Coverage Main findings 
Achleitner and 
Kloeckner (2005) 
Europe, 1997 - -2004 Employment in VC backed companies increases by 30.5 % per 
year between 1997 and 2004 
Alemany and Martí 
(2005) 
Sample of firms in Spain, 1989 
– 1998 
VC has a positive impact on employment in VC backed firms 
Audretsch and 
Lehmann (2004) 
Sample of firms in Germany, 
1997 – 2002 
Growth in terms of employment is higher in VC backed firms 
Belke et al. (2003) Country level (20 OECD 
countries), 1986 – 1999 
VC has a positive and significant impact on employment 
Bürgel et al. (2000) Sample of High-tech firms in 
Germany and the UK, 1997 
No significant effect of VC on employment growth 
Davila et al. (2003) Sample of Silicon Valley based 
Start-Ups, 1994 – 2000 
VC has a positive and significant effect on employment at the 
firm level 
Engel and Keilbach 
(2007) 
Firm level in Germany, 1995 – 
1998 
Employment of VC backed companies grows faster than 
employment of companies that are not backed by VC 
Manigart, et al. 
(2002) 
Sample of Belgian firms, 1987 – 
1997 
 VC backed companies do not exhibit a higher survival rate 
 The question is not whether young firms are backed by VC, 
but by which type pf VC (governmental, private) 
Peneder (2010) Sample of firms in Austria, 
1996 – 2005 
VC has a positive impact on employment in VC backed firms 
Popov and 
Roosenboom (2013) 
Country industry level in 
Europe, 1998 – 2008 
 VC has a positive and significant impact on firm births 
 Results hold after check for endogeneity via instrumental 
variables 
Puri and Zarutskie 
(2012) 
Firm level in the United States, 
1981 – 2005 
 Failure rate of VC backed firms is only half as high as the 
failure rate of firms without VC backing 
 Average employment is higher and grows faster for VC-
backed firms in comparison to firms without VC-backing  
Samila and Sorenson 
(2010) 
Regional level in the United 
States, 1993 – 2002 
VC has a positive impact on firm births by acting as an “catalyst 
for commercialization” 
Samila and Sorenson 
(2011) 
Regional level in the United 
States, 1993 – 2002 
VC has a positive impact on firm births, aggregate income and 
employment 
Zucker et al. (1998) Industry level in regions in the 
United States, 1976 – 1989 
 In contrast to human capital, VC is a negatively significant 
factor for the development of new firms 
 When it is not accounted for human capital, the coefficient of 
VC is positive 
There are some shortcomings of the previous research presented. For instance, by the studies at the firm 
level, the multiplier effect of VC, that is further explored in part 3, are not captured. In addition, in terms 
of business dynamics, only a few aspects have been analysed so far at an aggregate level, the most 
prominent of which is the aspect of employment creation. Business creation in terms of newly born firms 
has only been addressed by a few and firm survival by only one study. Finally, the inclusion of the 
multiplier effect and the effect of VC on a more ample range of measures has only attracted little attention 
so far. The present study aims to contribute to the closure of this gap by using the most recent data available 
for 21 European countries, the Baltic region and the United States. 
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3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The theoretical framework is divided into three steps. In part 3.1, the fundamental principles of the 
functions of VC at a microeconomic level are presented synoptically and expanded to the macroeconomic 
dimension. Part 3.2 shows the theoretical expectations of the effects of VC by means of the measures of 
business dynamics used in the present study. In order to illustrate the functioning, the main derivations of 
two formal models dealing with VC are described briefly in part 3.3. 
3.1 THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES OF VC 
The theoretical motivation for VC at the microeconomic level relies on the phenomena that Akerlof (1970) 
described and that is known as lemon problem in economic science. The problem arises when the 
information between two economic agents is asymmetric. Consequently, adverse selection and moral 
hazard paralyse or even disable the market mechanism. In the context of firm financing and capital 
provision one of the major contributions was made by authors arguing that financial intermediation could 
solve this problem. For instance, the study by Sahlman (1990) examines the mechanisms of VC that help 
to overcome the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard. Especially young firms in innovative 
industries such as biotechnology or information technology face the challenge of not having access to bank 
loans due to the uncertainty and specificity of their entrepreneurial projects (Amit et al., 1998). Investment 
by VC funds can thus provide capital to young firms as the specialization of the fund to certain industries 
and the monitoring of the investee reduces the information gap that causes the limitations of access to 
capital (for a literature review see Gompers & Lerner, 2001). In line with this, Kaplan and Strömberg 
(2001) stress out that the mitigation of the principal-agent problem bases on three pillars: specificity of the 
VC contracts, screening and monitoring. 
A by-product of VC investment is a networking, spillover, disciplinary and incentivizing effect, which is 
beneficiary to both the individual investee firm as well as to connected firms. Avnimelch and Teubal (2006) 
provide probably one of the most comprehensive study on this topic. Taking the Israeli VC industry as an 
example, they describe the indirect or often called multiplier effects of VC. For instance, they depict 
interactive and collective learning as one example among other effects of networking via the VC market. 
Thus, the whole economy benefits from this effect. As VC funds not only provide capital but also value 
added services to the backed companies, managerial and technological expertise is exchanged between the 
backed companies and the venture capitalists. In an analogous way, contacts to business partners help the 
young firms to develop their operations and to grow. The qualification process for funding and the 
provision of capital in subsequent investment rounds is often designed as a competition, which represents 
an incentive for the founders. Depending on the size of the VC industry in a country, this multiplier effect 
of VC on the economy is expected to be more or less pronounced.  
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3.2 RATIONALES OF THE IMPACT ON BUSINESS DYNAMICS 
The following section provides the theoretical rationales for the expectation of a positive influence of VC 
on business dynamics. For the study, the effects of VC on three different areas of influence in terms of 
business dynamics are considered: Firstly, the rationale of the impact of VC on the generation of economic 
activity is based on firm births as a measure of business dynamics. Secondly, the rationale for the impact 
of VC on the enhancement of economic activity of young firms is based on employment in newly born 
firms. Thirdly, the rationale for the impact of VC on the promotion of the success of young firms is based 
on firm survival rates. 
3.2.1 Generation of economic activity: Firm births 
Central to the rationale why VC leads to more business creation is the argument that VC provides financing 
to young and innovative firms that would otherwise not eligible for external funding, e.g. from banks. 
Generally, business creation depends on the development of the financial sector in a country (Aghion, 
Fally & Scarpetta, 2007, Rajan & Zingales, 1998) and finance is a crucial matter for innovative enterprises 
(Canepa & Stoneman, 2008, Magri, 2009). Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) formally showed this in a 
more general context. Their model describes how financial intermediation and economic growth stimulate 
each other. Based on this, the direct effect of VC on the generation of economic activity in the form of firm 
births can be described. 
The reasons why VC helps to increase firm births rely predominantly on the view that VC provides capital 
to young firms that would not be able to receive capital from banks or on the stock market. The superiority 
of VC over finance from banks and other institutions of capital provision manifests in its complementary 
virtues for financing of young innovative firms. Financial intermediation as the fundamental principle of 
VC becomes particularly effective in the case of VC because of its ability to select worthy projects and to 
promote the innovative character of the business it finances. VC is a form of financial intermediation with 
the particularity of being equipped with managerial and technological expertise. This enables venture 
capitalist to select valuable projects and to support the development of newly born innovative firms. During 
the very early phase, VC helps to realize ideas and to found a firm by providing capital and expertise 
(Audretsch & Lehmann 2004, Popov & Roosenboom, 2013). The selection of promising ideas and the 
provision of funding by venture capitalists is an instrument to overcome the difficulties that young firms 
face when they seek for external capital. Furthermore, entrepreneurs may only be willing to found a firm 
when they know that there will also be funding provided at a later stage of the firm (Popov & Roosenboom, 
2013). VC is able to provide this funding by subsequent investments into the firm, when the initial targets 
are met. Thus, the supply of VC is expected to matter for the creation of new enterprises in that sense. 
Depending on the entrepreneurial and technological experience of the founder, the provision of so-called 
value added services by the venture capitalists contributes to the success of the enterprise to a more or less 
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crucial part (Hellmann, 2000). For instance, they help to build a network, create contacts with suppliers 
and clients and give strategic advices (Sahlman, 1990, Bottazzi & Da Rin, 2002). According to the 
theoretical model by Michelacci and Suarez (2004), the character of VC as informed capital leverages the 
creation of business, as 
“the stock market promotes growth through business creation rather than savings. 
Specifically, [they] assume that the innovations introduced by successful young firms 
generate technological spillovers on future firms and, thus, feed the rate of technological 
progress. Technological progress, in turn, raises the profitability of new businesses and 
the value of informed capital, so it encourages firms to go public early. But, then, the rate 
of business creation rises, spillovers boost technological progress, and a virtuous circle 
is completed.” (Michelacci and Suarez, 2004, p 461) 
This captures already another, possibly even more ample rationale for VC being beneficial for firm births, 
the indirect or multiplier mechanism of VC. Firstly, the success of a newly born firm may encourage other 
not-yet entrepreneurs or employees of VC backed firms to start a business (Samila & Sorenson, 2011, 
Popov & Roosenboom, 2013). Secondly, the newly born firm itself creates a demand for new enterprises. 
Innovative ideas can create a new value chain or way of doing business in an industry, which could also 
imply the creation of new firms in the supplier’s business. Direct and indirect effect of VC lead to 
hypothesis 1: 
Venture capital has a positive effect on firm births. 
3.2.2 Enhancement of economic activity in young firms: Employment in newly born firms 
Concerning the enhancement of economic activity of young firms, the mechanism of the effect is analogous 
to the effect on then generation of economic activity. Again, a direct and an indirect effect can be 
distinguished. VC acts as a solution for the financing problem of young and innovative firms (Rajan & 
Zingales, 1998). As the birth of a firm entails employment as well as when the firm is growing, the 
theoretical linkage between VC and employment is straightforward. The growth of young firms in terms 
of employment may depend particularly on the supply of capital. Financial markets and VC supply in 
particular represents thus as a complement to the labour market as it engenders the resolution of a 
“bottleneck for job creation” (Belke et al., 2003, p. 28). In addition to this direct effect, VC enhances 
economic activity of young firms and increases employment in the economy via equivalent indirect and 
multiplier mechanisms as described above for firm births. Direct and indirect effect of VC lead to 
hypothesis 2: 
Venture capital has a positive effect on employment in newly born firms. 
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3.2.3 Abatement of failure of young firms: Firm survival 
Firm survival rates at a macroeconomic level are enhanced primarily through the value added services by 
venture capitalists (Sapienza, Manigart & Vermeir, 1996). The larger a VC industry in a country is the 
more young firms can benefit from the services provided by venture capitalists. Depending on the contract 
design between venture capital fund and investee, value added services of the VC provider comprehend 
the intervention or the advice in the actual operations of the young firm. Due to the expertise of venture 
capitalists in the area of finance, venture capitalist can provide financial consulting or serve with their 
network of financiers (Fried & Hisrich, 1995, Sahlman, 1990). According to Sapienza et al. (1996), 
operational and financial advice is the most valuable contribution for young firms. Furthermore, the 
network of venture capitalist can help in several ways: to find employees with specific technological 
expertise, to mediate for the occupation of management positions and to establish contacts to suppliers, 
service providers and costumer. Another important aspect is the discipline that a VC requires from the 
investee and that this pays-off not only for the venture capitalist but also for the young firm. Fried and 
Hisrich (1995) name two ways by which discipline bears a beneficial outcome of the relationship between 
the young firm and the venture capitalist. On the one hand side, venture capitalist require the managers of 
the young firm to stick to the goals formulated in the business plan and on the other hand side to exert 
pressure on the managers via the threat of replacement of the management and the staged provision of 
capital (Fried & Hisrich, 1995, Bottazzi & Da Rin, 2002). Finally, receiving VC acts as a signal for 
reputation towards potential personnel, suppliers, customers and investors (Manigart et al., 2002, 
Megginson & Weiss, 1991). Considering spillover and multiplier effect, the mechanisms not only affect 
the VC backed firms directly but also other young firms that are in contact with these firms. Altogether, 
the size of the VC industry and the degree of its professionalization in a country is expected to abate the 
failure of entrepreneurial projects and raise the survival rates of young firms. This leads to hypothesis 3: 
Venture capital has a positive effect on survival rates. 
3.3 MODELS ABOUT VC AND BUSINESS DYNAMICS 
The following section briefly outlines the propositions of the models developed by Keuschnigg (2004) and 
by Michelacci and Suarez (2004). Otherwise, only few theoretical studies (for a summary see 
Parhankangas, 2012) have modelled the macroeconomic implications of VC explicitly. Certainly, given 
the particularities of the VC industry and mechanisms by which they effect business creation, employment 
and business dynamics, a single model can hardly capture all aspects. Nevertheless, the two models help 
to explain the theoretical expectations of the macroeconomic effects of the VC industry. 
The overlapping generations model by Keuschnigg (2004) deals with the macroeconomic effect of VC. It 
explains how the particularities of VC, i.e. the provision of value added services and managerial advices 
to young firms by venture capitalist, lead to innovation driven growth in the economy as a whole. The 
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failure probability of entrepreneurial projects, which is due to the lack of commercial expertise of the firm 
founders, can be reduced by the involvement of a commercially experienced venture capitalist. Venture 
capitalists assist the founders and encourage the growth and the professionalization of the entrepreneurial 
project. A further aspect of the model is the inclusion of knowledge spillovers among firms. The 
combination of technological expertise from the founder and commercial knowledge from the venture 
capitalist lead then to innovation driven growth. 
Michelacci and Suarez (2004) present a model where “informed capital” (p. 459), as provided by venture 
capitalists stimulates business dynamics. The scarcity of this capital determines the ratio of new business 
created in an economy. For the determination of the steady state rate of business creation, they assume a 
matching function ℎ(𝑒, 𝑚) between capital searching entrepreneurs 𝑒  and capital offering monitors 𝑚 
(Michelacci & Suarez, 2004, p. 462). The monitors provide venture capital, value added services and 
require a share of the enterprise. Given this, the Poisson rate 𝑞(𝜃) by which an entrepreneur finds an 
investor that provides him informed capital can be derived. This rate depends negatively on the scarcity of 
informed capital, as represented by the index 𝜃 = 𝑒 𝑚⁄ . Rewriting 𝑞(𝜃), they get 
𝑞(𝜃) =
ℎ(𝑒, 𝑚)
𝑒
= ℎ (1,
1
𝜃
) 
The steady state rate of business creation depends on the stock of free informed capital 𝑚0 and the rate at 
which the capital is reused 𝜃𝑞(𝜃). Furthermore, 𝜆, the rate at which a firm discovers that it is successful is 
part of the equation and can be replace by the total stock of informed capital, 𝑀. They derive the steady 
state rate of business creation 𝑛 (for the derivation of this equation see appendix A.1). 3 
𝑛 = 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜆𝑚0 =
𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜆𝑀
𝜆 + [1 + (𝜆𝛾 𝜇⁄ )(1 − 𝑓)]𝜃𝑞(𝜃)
 
Thus the steady state rate of business creation increases with the stock of informed capital, 𝑀, as predicted 
by the theoretical considerations above. 
4 DATA 
To assess the research question, a panel was constructed covering 21 European countries, the Baltic 
countries as an aggregate and the United States from a number of publicly accessible sources, as 
summarized by the Table 15 in appendix A.2. The period covered by the panel is 2004 – 2012. These nine 
years were chosen due to data availability and comparability constraints. As the sources use different 
                                                     
3 As presented in the model by Michelacci and Suarez (2004, p. 465), the remaining parameters are described as 
follows: 𝜆 represents the Poisson rate at which a firm discovers whether it is successful, 𝛾 the probability that a firm 
is successful, 𝜇 the Poisson rate at which a successful firm matures and 𝑓 the probability that a non-mature successful 
firm goes public. 
18 
industry definitions, the most consistent way to match the figures on VC, business dynamics and for the 
control variables is to use the country level. Therefore, the observation unit is the country year. A 
convenience of this approach is that it allows capturing the multiplier effect of VC within an economy as 
described in part 3.2. Although it is not possible to distinguish between the direct effect of VC and the 
indirect effect, this is an advantage of the aggregate data as the multiplier effect is implicitly included. In 
order to make the data comparable and to conduct the estimations a number of data transformation had to 
be done which this section describes. 
4.1 MEASURES OF THE SIZE OF THE VC INDUSTRY 
Most of the previous literature uses firm level data from proprietary databases, such as the Thomson 
VentureXpert Database (e.g. Popov, & Roosenboom, 2013, Samila, & Sorenson, 2011). The present study 
relies on publicly accessible sources for the data on VC. The data about VC stems from the National 
Venture Capital Organization (NVCA) for the United States and from the European Venture Capital 
Organization (EVCA) for Europe. The amount of VC and the number of companies backed by VC funds 
per country and year represent the size of the countries’ VC industries. EVCA distinguishes three stages 
at which VC is invested: Seed, start-up and late stage venture. NVCA reports four stages of investment: 
Seed, early stage, expansion stage and late stage. For the study the aggregate of the respective subdivisions 
are used as they are in both cases reported as venture capital and coincide when comparing the definitions 
of the stages (OECD, 2014). 
Although the data are comparable, it has to be noted that there are some differences in the definitions and 
the methods of data collection between EVCA and NVCA (EVCA, 2015, NVCA, 2014). In the European 
case, the figures are published by EVCA as industry statistics, which means that the investment made by 
funds in the country are counted and not the investment a country received from any fund in Europe. Thus, 
the figures were multiplied by a coefficient of the domestic investment in order to exclude outgoing cross-
country investment that will not affect the business dynamics within the country. The inflow of VC into a 
country was not taken into account, because no information on the destinations of cross-country investment 
was available.4 In average 79.46 % of the amount invested was invested domestically, as well as 81.45 % 
of the companies backed by VC were firms within a country.5 As a further transformation, all data on 
European VC was extrapolated, given that EVCA estimates their coverage of the total market in their 
survey for 2013 at 90 % (EVCA, 2014).6 The data on the United States from NVCA covers only the 
domestic market, which means that no modification of the data was necessary (NVCA, 2015). Regarding 
the question to what extent, the NVCA covers the total market, no estimation could be found. Thus, it was 
                                                     
4 As it is described in part 6.2, it has been checked whether this influences the results. 
5 The figures are own calculation based on the data from EVCA. 
6 The figures of European VC were divided by 0.9 in order to extrapolate them to the total market. The extrapolation 
factor is according to the estimated coverage of the VC data collected by EVCA. 
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assumed, that the total market is reflected by the reported data. Finally, the invested VC amounts were 
deflated to constant 2005 prices and the European VC amounts were transformed to US Dollar. 
4.2 MEASURES OF BUSINESS DYNAMICS 
Concerning business dynamics, firm births and employment in the population of newly born firm were 
considered.7  The present study uses data on business dynamics from Eurostat (2015a). The industry 
aggregate consists here of the NACE codes B-N with exclusion of holding companies (sector code K642).8 
Thus, the business economy, as published by Eurostat, is included. Not included is the sector of agriculture 
as well as sectors that are typically provided publicly, such as education and health services. For the United 
States, business dynamics statistics from the United States Census Bureau are used (USCB, 2015). The 
USCB uses the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system. As the data was otherwise coherent, the 
numbers were only modified by excluding the agricultural sector. For the purpose of the study, only 
employer enterprises, that is firms with at least one employee, were considered in order to exclude holding 
companies and as this measure is seen to be best comparable internationally (Eurostat & OECD, 2007). A 
birth of an employer enterprise is defined as an enterprise birth that has at least one employee in the year 
of birth.9 In addition, the population of firm births comprises enterprises that existed already and employed 
for the first time at least one person in the year of the observation. Survival rates of newly born firms after 
three years were retrieved from Eurostat and the rates were calculated in the case of the United States 
following the Eurostat methodology. The reason for the analysis of the three-year survival rate will further 
be explored in the results. One drawback of this data is that also typically non-innovative firms and thus 
firms that are usually not in the investment scope of VC are included in the data on business dynamics (e.g. 
hairdressers). As these kinds of business are included in the data throughout all the countries, no bias 
should be expected from this. Despite some far-reaching harmonisation throughout European data on 
business dynamics, there are some differences between the countries in the collection of the data and the 
definition of a firm birth as counted in the statistics and as considered by national legislations (Eurostat & 
OECD, 2007, Eurostat, 2015b). Most importantly, the differences derive from inconsistencies in the need 
of legal registration of an enterprise across the countries. For instance, the thresholds to register a business 
depend in some countires on the turnover of the enterprise and the treatment of self-employment differ 
across countries. As the data delivered by Eurostat are, qualitatively and in terms of comparability, the best 
data available, the study uses this data on business dynamics. 
                                                     
7 The notion employment in the parts 5, 6 and 7 refer to the employment in the population of newly born firms. 
8 NACE refers to the Statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community. 
9 The notion firm births in the parts 5, 6 and 7 refers to this definition. 
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4.3 CONTROL VARIABLES 
Further components of the panel are gross fixed capital formation and patent applications. Both data sets 
are retrieved from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2015a). Gross fixed capital formation 
reflects aggregate investment in a country. It serves thus as a proxy for the financing of the business 
activities via debt and equity and captures macroeconomic shocks. The expectation is that a growth of the 
aggregate investment in a country will stimulate entrepreneurship and the creation of new firms. 
Accordingly, it promotes employment and the survival of firms. 
Taking patent applications as a way to capture innovation in a country follows the approach of some studies 
on VC (Samila & Sorenson, 2011, Schertler, 2007, Faria & Barbosa, 2014). In opposition to patent grants, 
the convenience of patent applications is that there is no or only a small time lag between the occurrence 
of innovation and its measurement. Certainly, there are some drawbacks of patents as a measure of 
innovation. It is often stated, that patents only reflect inventions and not innovation (Smith, 2006). On the 
one hand, they do hence not completely capture the innovative activity, as some technological advances 
are not patentable. On the other hand, patents are filed without incorporating a true novelty. Despite these 
drawbacks, it is a widely used method to measure innovation in the economic. This dependent variable is 
expected to increase when there are more innovative ideas and technological opportunities in an economy. 
Table 4 shows the summary statistics for the variables used for the regressions. Table 16 and Table 17 in 
appendix A.1 show more detailed descriptive statistics of the data. 
TABLE 4: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE VARIABLES USED FOR THE REGRESSIONS 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Between 
Std. Dev. 
Within 
Std. Dev. 
Obs
. 
Amount of VC in 2005 US$ per one million inhabitants 20.4 Mill. 2.69E+07 2.04E+07 1.79E+07 196 
Number of companies backed by VC per one million 
inhabitants 
11.09 11.93 10.83 5.31 196 
Number firm births per one million inhabitants 1,446.03 769.80 749.91 246.41 194 
Number of employees in the population of births per one 
million inhabitants 
4,033.78 2,670.78 2,627.76 957.54 178 
Rate of survival: Number of firms newly born in t-3 
having survived to t divided by number of firms newly 
born in t 
0.67 0.08 0.07 0.03 108 
Gross fixed capital formation in 2005 US$ per one 
million inhabitants 
7,790 Mill. 4.27E+09 4.26E+09 9.48E+08 205 
Patent applications per one million inhabitants 197.61 178.49 179.26 23.51 204 
All variables except the survival rate were transformed to numbers per one million inhabitants in order to 
adjust for the size of the countries. For the estimation of the models the logarithmed form are used for all 
of the variables except for the rates of survival. 
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4.4 FURTHER DATA 
In order to point out for further relevant factors for business dynamics, R&D expenditures and an indicator 
for the institutional environment for starting a business in a country were considered. Concerning R&D 
expenditures, the total intramural R&D expenditures from Eurostat was used. The distance to frontier 
factor for the category of Starting a Business is provided by the Doing Business Index project of the World 
Bank (2015b). This factor measures the distance of the institutional setting in a country to the best case 
among the countries, the frontier. The construction of the factor comprises the number of procedures that 
has to be taken to start a business, the necessary time in days, the cost and the minimum mandatory paid-
in capital into the new firm. Thus, the distance to frontier factor reflects the diversity of institutional 
preconditions across the countries, devoting the highest value to the country with the smallest distance to 
the best case expressed as a percentage average of the four component indicators. 
5 EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
The econometric part follows the methodology of the studies by Popov and Roosenboom (2013) and by 
Samila and Sorenson (2011). Thus, the regressions of the business dynamics variables on VC are conducted 
as suggested by Popov and Roosenboom (2013). In addition, a panel model is considered which takes into 
account the control variables. This model is similar to the basic model presented by Samila and Sorenson 
(2011), who estimated the impact of VC on a regional level in the United States during 1993 - 2002. For 
firm births and employment, the model is specified as follows: 
ln 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑉𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ln 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖,𝑡 
𝑌 represents firm births and employment in the population in the newly born firms respectively. Table 5 
gives an overview of the variables used for the main results. 𝑉𝐶 is the determinant of interest and represents 
the size of the VC industry. 𝑉𝐶, the determinant of the size of the venture capital industry, is represented 
by two different measures, by the amount of VC invested and the number of firms that were backed by 
VC. Both measures can be interpreted as a proxy for the size of the VC industry in a country. The VC 
variables reflect to a certain extent also the maturity of the industry, the incorporated expertise in the 
industry, the quality of the network and the amount of the capital providing services. However, these 
aspects can certainly not fully be captured by the two mentioned measures. C represents macroeconomic 
investment and is thus a proxy for the supply of other forms of capital in a country. 𝐼 captures innovation 
by using the number of patent applications. The standard models are estimated by OLS with country fixed 
effects. Country fixed effects capture country idiosyncrasies in dependent the variables. Another reason 
for the choice of OLS Fixed Effects as estimation method is that the variance between the countries is 
larger than within the countries, as Table 4 has shown. Thus, for instance firm births might depend on the 
sector composition of an economy. Countries with economic activity concentrated in large firms, for 
22 
instance in the manufacturing industry, may show a lower birth rate and less employment in the population 
of newly born firms. Throughout the regressions, the inclusion of year dummies are tested. These year 
dummies capture temporal events, such as the financial crisis of 2008. 
TABLE 5: COMPONENTS OF THE EMPIRICAL MODELS 
Variable type Determinant Variable name (short name) 
Dependent 
Y - Business dynamics Number firm births per one million inhabitants (Firm births) 
Number of employees in the population of births per one million 
inhabitants (Employment) 
3-year rate of survival (3Y Survival) 
Independent 
VC – Size of the VC industry Amount of VC in 2005 US$ per one million inhabitants (VC Amount) 
Number of companies backed by VC per one million inhabitants 
(Companies) 
Control 
C – Macroeconomic investment Gross fixed capital formation in 2005 US$ per one million inhabitants 
(Capital) 
I – Innovation Patent application per one million inhabitants (Patents) 
In the case of firm survival, the empirical model is slightly different. Survival rates are not logarithmed 
and a time lag is assumed, thus the equation becomes: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡+3 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑉𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝐶𝑖,𝑡+3 + 𝛽3 ln 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖,𝑡 
Another modifications is that not only 𝐶 in the year t, but also in t+3 and thus the same year which the 
survival rate refers to, are considered. Assuming a three-year lag of the effect is plausible, as it takes some 
years for VC to have an effect on the success of a firm. The benefits of the value added services provided 
by VC discussed in the section on the theoretical framework unfolds with some lags between the different 
actions of the agents involved. 
6 RESULTS 
The following section reports the results for the effects of VC in terms of amounts invested and in terms 
of number of companies backed per country and year on the number of born firms, employment in the 
population of newly born firms and the survival rates.10 As the availability of data is better for the first two 
measures of business dynamics, the analysis concentrates on firm births and employment and only shortly 
discusses firm survival. Besides the main results from the OLS Fixed Effects regressions, the results are 
checked for robustness and the endogeneity issue is addressed. The choice of the model specifications and 
the assessment of possible alternative approaches follow previous macroeconomic studies of VC, in 
particular the studies by Samila and Sorenson (2011) as well as by Popov and Roosenboom (2013). 
                                                     
10 Effect and other expressions that signify a causal relationship are used in this part of the analysis. However, these 
statements shall be treated cautiously, as far as endogeneity and the question of causality are not explicitly addressed. 
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6.1 MAIN RESULTS FOR THE LINKAGE OF VC AND BUSINESS DYNAMICS 
6.1.1 Firm births 
Column (i) of Table 6 gives the coefficient of the amount of VC from the regression on firm births and 
column (ii) the coefficient of the number of companies backed by VC. The columns (iii)-(vi) provide the 
coefficients with consideration of each of the control variables. The last two columns, column (vii) and 
(viii) show the results of the regression by taking into account all control variables jointly. All the 
regressions include country fixed effects. Year dummies were included depending on a Wald test. 11 
Resulting from these tests, no year dummies were included in all the estimations in which Capital was 
included. The importance of Capital as an explanatory determinant for firm births stands out. Concerning 
the variables of interest, VC amount and Companies, Table 6 reports a clear positive correspondence with 
firm births. However, only the coefficient of VC amount are significant for the estimation including 
Patents, as shown in column (v). The coefficients express elasticities and the interpretation is as follows: 
Using the example of column (vii), an increase of VC amount by one percent comes with an increase of 
firm births by 0.026 %. This coefficient is significant using standard errors that are not adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity, but becomes insignificant when adjusted.12 The value of the coefficient is relatively 
small in comparison to the highly significant coefficient of Capital, which corresponds to an increase of 
firm births by 0.464 %. The effect of a one percent increase of VC as represented by Companies on firm 
births is not much larger than VC amount with an increase of 0.045 %. However, this coefficient is not 
significant either when adjusting the standard errors for heteroskedasticity. Assuming a doubling of the 
VC amount or the number of companies backed gives a more meaningful interpretation. This would 
correspond to an increase of firm births by 1.8 % based on VC amount and 3.1 % based on Companies. In 
average, a country has 1,446 firm births per year and one million inhabitants. Consequently, doubling of 
VC would lead to 26 firm births per million inhabitants depending on VC amount or 43 depending on the 
number of companies backed by VC. Given to the relatively small size of the VC industry in some 
European countries, the provision of VC can thus be seen as an economically significant factor. 
                                                     
11 For each of the regression, Wald-tests were conducted. Wald tests were performed with the null-hypothesis that all 
the year dummies are jointly equal to zero. When this was not the case, the year dummies were included. 
12 The results not adjusted for heteroskedasticity are not reported. 
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TABLE 6: RESULTS FOR FIRM BIRTHS 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
Variable Firm births 
VC amount 0.014  0.011  0.029*  0.026  
 (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.02)  
Companies  0.020  0.016  0.045  0.045 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Capital   0.435** 0.450**   0.464** 0.497*** 
   (0.18) (0.18)   (0.17) (0.17) 
Patents     -0.083 -0.082 -0.133* -0.134* 
     (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Obs. 183 183 181 181 180 180 178 178 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Table 6 reports the estimates from the FE OLS regression. The dependent variable is firm births and the independent variables of interest are 
VC amount and Companies. Capital and patents are control variables. For the regressions, 23 countries and the years from 2004 to 2012 are 
considered. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity adjusted. 
* significance at the 10 % level, ** significance at the 5 % level, *** significance at the 1 % level 
From this first regression analysis and except for the regression of column (v), no evidence for the 
hypothesis that VC promotes the births of firms was found. Remarkable is the negative linkage between 
firm births and Patents. The average of patent applications throughout the countries were almost stable 
over time, whereas firm births were decreasing. This leads to the indication that stability in the measure of 
technological opportunities did not sustain the number of firm births. Half of the period covers the crisis 
years after 2008, where a decreasing number of firm births was recorded. Contrariwise, patent applications 
did not show a downshift during the crisis years. Patent applications might thus be less attractive for newly 
born firms during the crisis years and the majority of applications may not come from newly born firms 
but from large corporations. As already discussed in the section on data, patent applications are not an 
optimal measure for innovation in general and for innovation in the way, it is relevant for the creation of 
new firms. As an alternative measure, regressions with R&D expenditures as a measure for innovation are 
run. The coefficients in this case were, again, negative, probably due to similar reason. The results of these 
regressions are reported in appendix A.3. 
6.1.2 Employment in the population of newly born firms 
Parallel to the results on firm births, Table 7 shows the results from the regression of employment in the 
population of newly born firms on VC. The coefficients can again be interpreted as elasticities. Testing for 
the significance of year dummies indicates that these should be included in all the regressions conducted 
for employment. 
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TABLE 7: RESULTS FOR EMPLOYMENT 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
Variable Employment 
VC amount 0.038  0.029  0.049**  0.039**  
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Companies  0.035  0.030  0.053  0.049 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Capital   0.334 0.367   0.443 0.484* 
   (0.27) (0.28)   (0.26) (0.27) 
Patents     -0.078 -0.074 -0.103 -0.102 
     (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) 
Obs. 169 169 168 168 166 166 165 165 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Table 7 reports the estimates from the FE OLS regression. The dependent variable is employment in the population of firm births and the 
independent variables of interest are VC amount and Companies. Capital and patents are control variables. For the regressions, 23 countries and 
the years from 2004 to 2012 are considered. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity adjusted. 
* significance at the 10 % level, ** significance at the 5 % level, *** significance at the 1 % level 
Column (i) shows that a one percent change of VC amount corresponds to a change of Employment by 
0.038 %. The columns (i) – (iv) show that the coefficients of VC solely and of both VC variables with 
consideration of Capital are positive but not statistically significant. The only significant coefficients are 
the coefficients of VC amount when controlling for innovation by means of Patents in column (v) and with 
all the control variables in column (vii). When controlling for both, capital and patents, a one percent 
increase of VC amount corresponds to an increase of 0.039 % and a one percent increase of Companies to 
an increase of employment by 0.049 %. However, the coefficient of companies is not statistically 
significant when the heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are used. Repeating the exercise from before 
and given that the average employment in the population of newly born firms throughout the countries is 
4034 employees in the population of newly born firms per million inhabitants, a doubling of the VC amount 
would lead to an increase of employment by 2.7 % or by 118 employees per million inhabitants. Taking 
the coefficient of Companies, a doubling of the number of firms backed by VC relates to 3.5 % more 
employment or an upshift by 142 employees in the population of newly born firms per million inhabitants. 
6.1.3 Survival rates 
The third dependent variable of interest is survival rates. Table 8 shows the results for 3Y Survival, the 
survival of newly born firm over three years. Based on the theoretical considerations and after checking 
with other lags, the 3-year survival rate appeared to be the most plausible linkage. Appendix A.4 shows 
alternative specifications of the models with the 1-year and 2-year survival rate. The interpretation of the 
coefficients is different from the other two dependent variables. As 3Y Survival is not logarithmed, a one 
percent change of VC corresponds to a change in percentage points as given by the coefficient in the table. 
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TABLE 8: RESULTS FOR 3-YEAR FIRM SURVIVAL 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
Variable 3-year firm survival rate in t+3 
VC am. in t 0.009*  0.013***  0.013***  0.014***  
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Comp. in t  0.014  0.018***  0.019*  0.021*** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Capital in t   -0.151*** -0.137***   -0.148*** -0.132*** 
   (0.05) (0.05)   (0.05) (0.05) 
Capital in t+3   0.087 0.095   0.066 0.077 
   (0.05) (0.06)   (0.05) (0.06) 
Patents in t     -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.023** -0.023** 
     (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Obs. 103 103 101 101 101 101 99 99 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Table 8 reports the estimates from the FE OLS regression. The dependent variable is the rate of survival of firms born 3 years before and the 
independent variables of interest are VC amount and Companies. Capital and patents are control variables. For the regressions, 23 countries and 
the years from 2004 to 2012 are considered. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity adjusted. 
* significance at the 10 % level, ** significance at the 5 % level, *** significance at the 1 % level 
The pattern of the results differs a lot from the results received from the regressions of firm births and 
employment. Except for the result of Companies in column (ii), the coefficients for VC are all significant 
and the linkage is positive. The coefficient of VC amount and Companies are significant at the 1 % level 
when considering capital as control variables, as reported by column (iii), (iv), (vii) and (viii). In addition, 
VC amount is highly significant when controlling for innovation, as described by column (v). The 
interpretation of column (vii) is that a one percent increase of VC amount corresponds to an increase of 
the survival rate by 0.014 percentage points. If the number of firms backed by VC increases by one percent, 
the survival rate is raised by 0.021 percentage points. The average 3-year survival rate is 67 %, that means 
67 out of 100 born firms in a year still exist three years later. From a doubling of VC amount, corresponds 
then to a raise of this rate by one percentage point. In the case of a two times larger number of firms backed 
by VC, the survival rate would increase by 1.5 percentage points up to a rate of 68.5 %. 
6.2 ADDRESSING VARIOUS DATA ISSUES 
Certainly, there are a number of issues that should be addressed in order to see whether the estimates are 
robust. As described in the section on data, a number of transformations to the data on VC have been 
undertaken. In order to check how these transformations influenced the results, regressions without the 
application of the transformations are conducted. Without the extrapolation of the data to the estimated 
total market and without adjusting to the amount of VC invested domestically and the number of companies 
that are backed by VC within a country by domestic VC sources does not change the results profoundly. 
Furthermore, Popov and Roosenboom (2013) suggest some checks of robustness. In their study, the 
strongest and weakest countries are excluded from the estimations. This issue, the question of the temporal 
structure and the issue of endogeneity are discussed in the following. 
6.2.1 Exclusion of outlier countries 
For this study, the United States as the country with the largest VC in relation to inhabitants and Hungary, 
Romania, the Baltics, Poland, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic as the countries with the smallest VC 
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industry are excluded.13 Table 9 presents the results of the estimations with the remaining 16 European 
countries. The coefficients are positive and significant values are given in columns (vi) and (v). 
Remarkable is that the significant coefficients become larger. The coefficient of the linkage of companies 
and firm births raise from 0.045 % to 0.08 %. Similarly, the coefficient of the linkage between companies 
and employment nearly doubles, increasing from 0.049 % to 0.093 %. For firm births and employment, 
this indicates that with the present country selection, it is rather the number of companies backed that has 
a larger impact than the amount of VC invested. In the case of survival rates as reported by column (v) and 
(vi), the coefficient of VC amount is slightly larger compared to the results that include all the countries. 
TABLE 9: RESULTS WITH 16 COUNTRIES 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Variable Firm births in t Employment in t 3-year firm survival rate in t+3 
VC am. in t 0.016  0.037  0.017*  
 (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.01)  
Comp. in t  0.080  0.093*  0.018 
  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.01) 
Capital in t 0.840*** 0.815*** 0.836*** 0.805*** -0.112 -0.098 
 (0.21) (0.20) (0.24) (0.22) (0.08) (0.07) 
Capital in t+3     0.081 0.109 
     (0.07) (0.09) 
Patents in t -0.096 -0.085 -0.059 -0.047 -0.017 -0.014 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) 
Obs. 128 128 121 121 67 67 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Table 9 reports the estimates from the FE OLS regression. The dependent variables are firm births, employment and the rate of survival of firms 
born 3 years before. The independent variables of interest are VC amount and Companies. Capital and patents are control variables. For the 
regressions, 16 countries and the years from 2004 to 2012 are considered. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are 
heteroskedasticity adjusted. 
* significance at the 10 % level, ** significance at the 5 % level, *** significance at the 1 % level 
Consequently, the deductions remain largely the same as before. VC is not a significant factor for firm 
births, but seems to matter for employment and firm survival. However the magnitudes of the coefficient 
change, which shows that the country circumstances seem to matter for the linkage between VC and 
business dynamics. 
6.2.2 Temporally distributed linkage of VC and business dynamics 
Table 10 shows the temporal structure of the effect of VC on firm births. Both leads and lags of the VC 
variables show positive coefficients. Significant results are only obtained for regressions considering 
Companies with a lead, as shown by columns (v) and (vi). This indicates that the causal relationship might 
run in the other direction and firm births stimulate VC investment. 
                                                     
13 Figure 2 and Figure 3 in appendix A.5 show the different sizes of the VC industry of the countries by means of VC 
amount invested. 
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TABLE 10: TEMPORAL STRUCTURE OF VC AND FIRM BIRTHS 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
Variable Firm births 
Lead / lag of VC amount of Companies 
2-year lead 0.018    0.061**    
 (0.02)    (0.03)    
1-year lead  0.031    0.071*   
  (0.02)    (0.04)   
1-year lag   0.029    0.060  
   (0.02)    (0.04)  
2-year lag    0.034    0.065 
    (0.03)    (0.05) 
Capital 0.480** 0.422** 0.430** 0.375* 0.533** 0.475** 0.450** 0.392** 
 (0.20) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) 
Patents -0.124 -0.114 -0.203* -0.224* -0.115 -0.118 -0.198 -0.208* 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.11) 
Obs. 162 181 177 176 162 181 177 176 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Table 10 reports the estimates from the FE OLS regression. The dependent variable is firm births and the independent variables of interest are 
VC amount and Companies. Capital and patents are control variables. For the regressions, 23 countries and the years from 2004 to 2012 are 
considered. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity adjusted. 
* significance at the 10 % level, ** significance at the 5 % level, *** significance at the 1 % level 
The temporal assessment of the linkage between VC and employment is presented in Table 11. Similarly, 
to the case of firm births, the estimates of the leads and lags of VC are positive but non-significant 
coefficients. Hence, the only significant result for the linkage of VC on employment is thus obtained by 
the variable of VC amount and without assuming a temporal lead or lag of the effect as shown in part 6.1.2. 
TABLE 11: TEMPORAL STRUCTURE OF VC AND EMPLOYMENT 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
Variable Employment 
Lead / lag of VC amount of Companies 
2-year lead 0.004    0.042    
 (0.02)    (0.04)    
1-year lead  0.038    0.078   
  (0.02)    (0.05)   
1-year lag   0.016    0.023  
   (0.01)    (0.03)  
2-year lag    0.006    0.022 
    (0.02)    (0.04) 
Capital 0.511*** 0.463*** 0.471*** 0.380*** 0.528*** 0.502*** 0.475*** 0.385*** 
 (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Patents -0.092 -0.074 -0.165** -0.162** -0.076 -0.077 -0.166** -0.158** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Obs. 151 170 165 164 151 170 165 164 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Table 11 reports the estimates from the FE OLS regression. The dependent variable employment in the population of firm births and the 
independent variables of interest are VC amount and Companies. Capital and patents are control variables. For the regressions, 23 countries 
and the years from 2004 to 2012 are considered. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity adjusted. 
* significance at the 10 % level, ** significance at the 5 % level, *** significance at the 1 % level 
6.2.3 The endogeneity problem 
A major concern in the type of regressions conducted in part 6.1 is the issue of endogeneity between VC 
and firm births as well as VC and employment. It could be that firm births and employment, the dependent 
variables, influence the VC variables or the VC and the dependent variables are simultaneously influenced 
by a third factor, which leads to too high values of the coefficients and to a possibly false conclusion 
concerning the significance. The problem of endogeneity has been addressed in the literature for firm births 
(Popov & Roosenboom, 2013) and in the case of employment (Belke et al., 2003). One suggested approach 
comprises the usage of the liberalization of pension fund investment as an instrument (see, for instance, 
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Kortum & Lerner, 2000, Popov & Roosenboom, 2013). For the purpose of this study, the panel structure 
of the data is exploited and the lagged dependent variable is instrumented by itself with two lags. 
Following the procedure as suggested by Belke et al. (2003), lagged firm births (employment) is 
instrumented by using the second lag of firm births (employment). Table 12 reports the results of the two 
stage least square regression (2SLS) for VC and firm births. The results for firm births underpin the 
indication found from the assessment of the temporal structure. As none of the VC coefficients is 
significant, the results suggest that VC is endogenous and either affected by firm births in a country or both 
measures are commonly influenced by an omitted factor. 
TABLE 12: RESULTS FOR INSTRUMENTED FIRM BIRTHS 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
Variable Firm births in t 
Births in t-1 0.658*** 0.691*** 0.488*** 0.484*** 0.613*** 0.654*** 0.438*** 0.434*** 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) 
VC am. in t -0.003  0.007  0.001  0.010  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  
Comp. in t  -0.036  0.009  -0.030  0.014 
  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
Capital in t   0.458*** 0.477***   0.509*** 0.534*** 
   (0.14) (0.13)   (0.14) (0.14) 
Patents in t     -0.058 -0.060 -0.150*** -0.151*** 
     (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Obs. 144 144 142 142 143 143 141 141 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Table 12 reports the estimates from the 2SLS regression with fixed effects. The lagged firm births are instrumented by two-lagged firm births. 
Capital and patents are control variables. For the regressions, 23 countries and the years from 2004 to 2012 are considered. 
* significance at the 10 % level, ** significance at the 5 % level, *** significance at the 1 % level 
Table 13 reports the results of the same exercise applied to the variable of employment. The only significant 
coefficient is given by VC amount in column (vii). It has roughly the magnitude of the coefficients found 
in the OLS FE regressions and is significant at the 5 % level. This suggests only a very weak evidence for 
VC being an exogenous variable for the explanation of employment. The first stages of the estimation 
procedures are reported in appendix A.5. 
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TABLE 13: RESULTS FOR INSTRUMENTED EMPLOYMENT 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
Variable Employment in t 
Empl. in t-1 0.311 0.304 0.229 0.203 0.251 0.256 0.087 0.088 
 (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) (0.22) (0.21) (0.23) (0.17) (0.17) 
VC am. in t 0.029  0.026  0.032  0.042**  
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Comp. in t  0.011  0.025  0.015  0.047 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
Capital in t   0.457** 0.514**   0.901*** 1.001*** 
   (0.19) (0.21)   (0.19) (0.21) 
Patents in t     -0.171* -0.188** -0.282*** -0.310*** 
     (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Obs. 120 120 120 120 119 119 119 119 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Table 13 reports the estimates from the 2SLS regression with fixed effects. The lagged employment are instrumented by two-lagged 
employment. Capital and patents are control variables. For the regressions, 22 countries and the years from 2004 to 2012 are considered (in this 
case the Baltic country aggregate is excluded due to missing data).  
* significance at the 10 % level, ** significance at the 5 % level, *** significance at the 1 % level 
6.2.4 Further factors for business dynamics 
There are certainly a number of further aspects that matter for business dynamics and for young firms in 
particular. One important determinant is the ease of founding a firm in a country based on legal and 
financial requirements. Indeed, the pattern in terms of the number of newly born firms differs from country 
to country, as Figure 4 and Figure 5 on firm births in appendix A.5 illustrate. Figure 1 shows the indicator 
of starting a business and illustrates that there are some differences across the countries. 
FIGURE 1: STARTING A BUSINESS INDICATOR FROM EASE OF DOING BUSINESS PROJECT (OWN GRAPH USING DATA FROM WORLD 
BANK, 2015B) 
 
The composition of this indicator has been explained in part 4.4. In order to illustrate the disparities among 
the countries concerning the ease of starting a business, a few examples are depicted. With three procedures 
in average over the years 2004 - 2012, registering a new firm required the lowest numbers of procedures 
in Finland among the countries in scope (own calculations using data from World Bank, 2015b). In terms 
of days that it takes for the registration of firms, Denmark is the leading country with an average of six 
days over the sample period. In contrast to this, it took the most procedures and days in order to register a 
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new firm in Spain with ten procedures and 74 days. The costs of registration was lowest in Denmark. 
There, no official fees or fees for legal services arise, whereas in Italy, a founding entrepreneur had to deal 
with average costs of almost 20 % of the country’s per capita income. Ireland and the United Kingdom 
have no minimum amount to be paid in into a bank account before the registration of a firm. However, in 
Poland the average of the percentage based on the country’s income per capita that was required to be paid 
in by a founder amounted to an average of 147 %. For 2012, this minimum deposit decreased to 14 percent 
though. These country idiosyncrasies in the legal and financial requirements for the founding of a firm 
reflect that the institutional background of the countries differs severely. As this may influence the rate of 
firm births, it is of importance to acknowledge these country idiosyncrasies. Appendix A.3 shows an 
alternative regression model with consideration of the Starting a business indicator.  
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The purpose of this study was to explore how the size of the VC industry in a country affects business 
dynamics. The hypotheses were that VC has a positive influence on the generation of economic activity, 
on its enhancement and on the abatement of failures of young firms. Therefore, the variables of business 
dynamics analysed were firm births, employment in the population of newly born firms and survival rate 
of young firms over three years. In terms of VC, the variables assessed were amount of VC invested in a 
country domestically and number of backed companies by domestic VC. In contrast to earlier studies as 
conducted by Samila and Sorenson (2011) as well as Popov and Roosenboom (2013), no evidence could 
be found for VC as a factor for firm births from OLS Fixed effects regressions. A weak effect has been 
found for the linkage of VC on employment, as the coefficients were significant in three out of eight cases. 
In order to demonstrate the magnitude of the impact of VC on business dynamics in a concrete way, 
percentage increases were calculated by assuming that the VC supply doubles. Table 14 summarizes these 
increases measured in percent for firm births and for employment in newly born firms, as well as in 
percentage points for the 3-year survival rate. 
TABLE 14: EFFECT OF DOUBLING THE SUPPLY OF VC 
 VC amount Companies 
Effect on 
Firm births in 
% 
Employment 
in % 
3Y Survival 
in % points 
Firm births in 
% 
Employment 
in % 
3Y Survival 
in % points 
OLS FE 0.98 2.67 0.63* 1.40 2.46 0.98 
OLS FE with Capital 0.77 2.03 0.91*** 1.12 2.10 1.26*** 
OLS FE with Patents 2.03* 3.45** 0.91*** 3.17 3.74 1.33* 
OLS FE with all control variables 1.82 2.74** 0.98*** 3.17 3.45 1.47*** 
2SLS FE -0.21 2.03 - -2.46 0.77 - 
2SLS FE with Capital 0.49 1.82 - 0.63 1.75 - 
2SLS FE with Patents 0.07 2.24 - -2.06 1.05 - 
2SLS FE with all control variables 0.70 2.95** - 0.98 3.31 - 
Table 14 summarizes the results obtained by the different estimation approaches. The figures show the percentage increase assuming a doubling 
of the VC amount or the number of companies backed by VC the variables of firm births and employment. For the variables 3Y survival, the 
survival rate of newly born firms over three years, the increase in terms of percentage points of the survival rate is shown. 
Respective regression results were significant at * the 10 % level, ** the 5 % level, *** the 1 % level 
Thus, the increase for firm births amounts to 3.17 % at its maximum. Some negative values have been 
found by the 2SLS regressions, of which -2.46 % is the smallest. For employment, the increase lies between 
0.77 and 3.74 % when VC supply doubles. Regarding thee-year survival, the survival rate increases 
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between 0.63 and 1.47 percentage points. Whereas the effect of VC on firm births is not significant and 
the effect on employment of weak significance. The coefficients are in both cases of an economically 
significant size. Although an immediate comparison is not possible, the magnitude of the coefficient 
appears to be roughly of the same size as the effects shown by Samila and Sorenson (2011), who found an 
increase of 0.77 % of firm births when the amount of VC is doubled. As the average of firm births 
throughout the 323 metropolitan statistical areas in the United States, the observation unit in their study, is 
1,425 firms, the increase amounts to 11 firms. This is half of the effect the present study has observed. 
However, their study applies a broader definition of firm births, not only taking into account employer 
enterprises but also firms with zero employees. This and the different unit of observation explains the 
deviation in the results. In the case of firm survival, the results indicate that there is a strong linkage of VC 
and the ratio of firms surviving over three years in a country. This contradicts the conclusions derived by 
Manigart et al. (2002), who do not support the view that VC matter for firm survival in general. However, 
this difference in the results could be due to the different study design and to the particularity of the present 
study, which takes into account the multiplier effect of VC. The findings indicate, that the function of VC 
is to support young firms via the managerial and commercial expertise venture capitalists can contribute 
during the development and to the abatement of the failure of young firms. It is not that important for the 
stimulation of business creation. 
Some limitations of this study and of the data used have to be acknowledged. Due to restraints in the data 
availability, other forms of capital supplies to young firms, such as investments by business angels, 
corporate VC and through government grants were not considered explicitly and only domestic VC was 
part of the study. Hence, inflows of VC from foreign sources were neglected. On years where respective 
data on the actual amount of VC investment domestically were available, checks have been conducted 
whether this changes the findings. The results did not change severely and these limitations can thus be 
seen as minor shortcomings of the study. The results of firm survival could not be checked for endogeneity 
due to missing data. As discussed in OECD (2014), country idiosyncrasies in the attitude towards 
entrepreneurship and in the functioning of the financial market, could cause biased regressions. For this 
study, only the size of the VC industries in the countries was considered. A variable that is partly captured 
by the used measures but not considered explicitly is the quality of VC, as Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002) 
point out. Finally, concerning the empirical methodology other models, for instance with another time 
structure or an autoregressive component could be considered. 
Given the finding that VC does not matter that much for generation of economic activity but for the support 
of young firms, the attention that VC receives by policymakers with regard to the promotion of business 
creation should be reconsidered. The findings argue for the view that the most beneficial effect of VC 
unfolds in the later stages of a young firm. VC provides a valuable contribution during the expansion of 
firms and helps to abate firm failures through its value added services. Policymakers should thus 
concentrate on the supply of late stage VC. This is in line with authors who promote the view that VC is 
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rather an instrument for the commercialization and professionalization of innovative entrepreneurial 
projects and that the effect of VC at the late stage is more pronounced (e.g. Faria & Barbossa, 2014). The 
focus of policy should consequently be put on the design of policy instruments aiming at the promotion of 
VC that concentrates rather on the growth stage than on the seed stage. 
For future research, there is still a large range of open questions on the the topic on how VC and business 
dynamics are interconnected. How does the type of VC matter for business dynamics and how does VC 
matter in comparison the conditions of its specific environment? As it has been shown in the analysis, the 
country environment matters, how does the impact of VC differ across countries? Similarly, how does 
industry specific effects matter? What is the exact mechanism of the linkage and through which channels 
of the value added services is VC beneficial for firm births, employment and the survival of firms? And 
finally, how does the quality of these services matter and how can it be increased? With data on the extent, 
the form and the quality of the value added services by different types of venture capitalists and by different 
types of recipients, these questions could be explored further. 
  
34 
REFERENCE LIST 
Achleitner, A.‐K. & Kloeckner, O. (2005). Employment Contribution of Private Equity and Venture 
Capital in Europe, Available Online: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1113782 [Accessed 23 April 
2015] 
Aghion, P., Fally, T., & Scarpetta S. (2007). Credit Constraints as a Barrier to the Entry and Post-entry 
Growth of Firms. Economic Policy, vol. 22, no. 52, pp. 732-779 
Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 488-500 
Alemany, L., and Martí, J. (2005). Unbiased Estimation of Economic Impact of Venture Capital Backed 
Firms, EFA 2005 Moscow Meetings Paper Available Online: 
http://www.efmaefm.org/0EFMAMEETINGS/EFMA%20ANNUAL%20MEETINGS/2005-
Milan/papers/6-alemany_paper.pdf [Accessed 24 April 2015] 
Audretsch, D. B. & Lehmann, E. E. (2004). Financing High-tech Growth: The Role of Banks and Venture 
Capitalists. Schmalenbach Business Review, vol. 56, pp. 340-357 
Amit, R., Brander, J., & Zott, C. (1998). Why Do Venture Capital Firms Exist? Theory and Canadian 
Evidence, Journal of Business Venturing, vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 441-466 
Arqué-Castells, P. (2012). How Venture Capitalists Spur Invention in Spain: Evidence from Patent 
Trajectories, Research Policy, vol. 41, no. 5, pp. 897-912 
Avnimelech, G., & Teubal, M. (2006). Creating Venture Capital Industries That Co-evolve with High 
Tech: Insights from an Extended Industry Life Cycle Perspective of the Israeli Experience, Research 
Policy vol. 35, no. 10, pp. 1477-1498 
Baum, J. A. C., & Silverman, B. S. (2004). Picking Winners or Building them? Alliance, Intellectual, and 
Human Capital as Selection Criteria in Venture Financing and Performance of Biotechnology 
Startups, Journal of business venturing, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 411-436 
Belke, A. H., Fehn, R., & Foster-McGregor, N. (2003). Does Venture Capital Investment Spur 
Employment Growth?, working paper no. 930, CESifo 
Bertoni, F., Croce, A., & D'Adda, D. (2010). Venture Capital Investments and Patenting Activity of High-
tech Start-ups: A Micro-econometric Firm-level Analysis, Venture Capital: An International Journal 
of Entrepreneurial Finance, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 307-326 
Bottazzi, L., & Da Rin, M. (2002). Venture Capital in Europe and the Financing of Innovative Companies. 
Economic Policy, vol. 17 no. 34, pp. 229-270 
35 
Brander, J. A., Egan, E., & Hellmann, T. F: (2010). Government Sponsored versus Private Venture Capital: 
Canadian Evidence in J. Lerner & A. Schoar, (eds), International Differences in Entrepreneurship, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 275-320 
Bulevska, A. (2014). Can Economic Growth Be Enhanced by Venture Capital Employment?, Journal of 
Sustainable Development, vol. 5, no. 10, pp. 50-69 
Bürgel, O., Fier, A., Licht, G., & Murray, G. C. (2000). Internationalisation of High-tech Start-ups and 
Fast Growth - Evidence for UK and Germany, working paper, no. 00-35, ZEW, Mannheim 
Canepa, A. & Stoneman, P. (2008). Financial Constraints to Innovation in the UK: Evidence from CIS2 
and CIS3, Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 60, pp. 711-730 
Caselli, S., Gatti, S., & Perrini, F. (2009). Are Venture Capitalists a Catalyst For Innovation?, European 
Financial Management, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 92-111 
Chemmanur, T. J., Krishnan, K., & Nandy, D. K. (2011). How Does Venture Capital Financing Improve 
Efficiency in Private Firms? A Look Beneath the Surface. Review of financial studies, vol. 24, no. 12, 
pp. 4037-4090 
Da Rin, M., Hellmann, T. F., & Puri, M. (2011). A Survey of Venture Capital Research, working paper, 
no. 17523, National Bureau of Economic Research 
Davila, A., Foster, G., & Gupta, M. (2003). Venture Capital Financing and the Growth of Startup Firms, 
Journal of Business Venturing, vol. 18, no. 6, pp. 689-708 
Dushnitsky, G., & Lenox, M. J. (2005). When Do Incumbents Learn From Entrepreneurial Ventures?: 
Corporate Venture Capital and Investing Firm Innovation Rates, Research Policy, vol. 34, no. 5, pp. 
615-639 
Engel, D., & Keilbach M. (2007). Firm-level Implications of Early Stage Venture Capital Investment - An 
Empirical Investigation. Journal of Empirical Finance, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 150-167 
EU Commission (1998). Risk Capital – A Key to Job Creation in the European Union. Available Online: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary1138_en.htm [Accessed 28 
April 2015] 
EU Commission (2010). Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth. Available 
Online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:2020:FIN:EN:PDF 
[Accessed 30 May 2015] 
European Investment Bank (EIB, 2015). What InnovFin Products Are Available and Who Can Benefit 
from Them? Available Online: 
http://www.eib.org/products/blending/innovfin/products/index.htm?lang=en [Accessed 29 May 
2015] 
36 
Eurostat & OECD (2007). Eurostat − OECD Manual on Business Demography Statistics, Available 
Online: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3859598/5901585/KS-RA-07-010-
EN.PDF/290a71ec-7a71-43be-909b-08ea6bcdc521?version=1.0 [Accessed 15 May 2015] 
Eurostat (2015a). Business Demography by Size Class (from 2004 onwards, NACE Rev. 2), Available 
Online: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database [Accessed 10 April 2015] 
Eurostat (2015b). Country Specific Notes in Business Demography, Available Online: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/Annexes/bd_esms_an2.pdf [Accessed 13 May 2015] 
European Venture Capital Association (EVCA, 2013). Exploring the Impact of Private Equity on 
Economic Growth in Europe, Frontier Economics, London, Available Online: 
http://www.evca.eu/media/61219/Frontier_Economics_Report.pdf [Accessed 2 February 2015] 
European Venture Capital Association (EVCA, 2014). Annual Activity Statistics, Available Online: 
http://www.evca.eu/research/activity-data/annual-activity-statistics/ [Accessed 19 November 2014] 
European Venture Capital Association (EVCA, 2015). Activity Data Methodology. Available Online: 
http://www.evca.eu/research/activity-data/data-methodology/ [Accessed 14 April 2015] 
Faria, A. P., & Barbosa, N. (2014). Does Venture Capital Really Foster Innovation?, Economics Letters, 
vol. 122, no. 2, pp. 129-131 
Fried, V. H., & Hisrich R. D. (1995). The Venture Capitalist: A Relationship Investor, California 
Management Review, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 101-113 
Gompers, P. A., & Lerner, J. (1999). What Drives Venture Capital Fundraising?, working paper, no. 6906, 
NBER 
Gompers, P. A., & Lerner, J. (2001). The Venture Capital Revolution. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 145-168 
Greenwood, J., & Jovanovic, B. (1990). Financial Development, Growth, and the Distribution of Income, 
The Journal of Political Economy, vol. 98 no. 5, pp. 1076-1107 
Hege, U., Palomino, F., & Schwienbacher A. (2009). Venture Capital Performance: The DisparityBetween 
Europe and the United States, Revue de l'association française de finance, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 7-50 
Hellmann, T. (2000). Venture Capitalists: the Coaches of Silicon Valley in L. Chong-Moon Lee, W.F. 
Miller, M. Gong Hancock, & H.S. Rowen, (eds), The Silicon Valley Edge: A Habitat for Innovation 
and Entrepreneurship, Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 276-294 
Hirukawa, M., & Ueda M.(2008). Venture Capital and Industrial “Innovation”, working paper, no. 7089, 
Centre for Economic Policy Research 
37 
Hirukawa, M., & Ueda M.(2011). Venture Capital and Innovation Which is First?, Pacific Economic 
Review, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 421-465 
Jeng, L. A., & Wells, P. C. (2000). The Determinants of Venture Capital Funding: Evidence Across 
Countries. Journal of corporate Finance, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 241-289 
Kaplan, S. N., & Strömberg P. (2001). Venture Capitalists as Principals: Contracting, Screening, and 
Monitoring, American Economic Review, vol. 91, no. 2, pp. 426-430 
Kortum, S., & Lerner, J. (2000). Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation. RAND 
Journal of Economics, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 674-692 
Keuschnigg, C. (2004). Venture Capital Backed Growth, Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 
239-261 
Leleux, B., & Surlemont, B. (2003). Public Versus Private Venture Capital: Seeding or Crowding out? A 
Pan-European Analysis, Journal of Business Venturing, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 81-104 
Manigart, S., Baeyens, K., & Van Hyfte, W. (2002). The Survival of Venture Capital Backed Companies, 
Venture Capital: An International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 103-124 
Magri, S. (2009). The Financing of Small Innovative Firms: The Italian Case. Economics of Innovation 
and New Technology, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 181-204 
Megginson, W. L. & Weiss, K. A., 1991, Venture Capitalist Certification in Initial Public Offerings, 
Journal of Finance, vol. 46 no., pp. 879–903 
Michelacci, C., & Suarez, J. (2004). Business Creation and the Stock Market. The Review of Economic 
Studies, vol. 71, no. 2, pp. 459-481 
National Venture Capital Association (NVCA, 2014). National Venture Capital Association Yearbook 
2014, Available Online: http://nvca.org/research/stats-studies/ [Accessed 23 February 2015] 
National Venture Capital Association (NVCA, 2015). Venture Investment, Available Online: 
http://nvca.org/research/venture-investment/ [Accessed 23 February 2015] 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2013). Science, Technology and 
Industry Scoreboard 2013 – Innovation for Growth, OECD Publishing, Available Online: 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/oecd-science-technology-and-industry-
scoreboard-2013_sti_scoreboard-2013-en [ Accessed 9 March 2015] 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2014), Entrepreneurship at a Glance 
2014, OECD Publishing, Available Online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/entrepreneur_aag-2014-en 
[Accessed 22 April 2015] 
38 
Parhankangas, A. (2012). The Economic Impact of Venture Capital in H. Landström, C. Mason, (eds), 
Handbook of Research on Venture Capital. Volume 2: A Globalizing Industry, Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, pp. 124-158 
Peneder, M. (2010). The Impact of Venture Capital on Innovation Behaviour and Firm Growth, Venture 
Capital, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 83-107 
Popov, A. & Roosenboom P. (2012). Venture Capital and Patented Innovation: Evidence from Europe, 
Economic Policy, vol. 27, no. 71, pp. 447-482 
Popov, A. & Roosenboom P. (2013). Venture Capital and New Business Creation, Journal Banking & 
Finance, vol. 37, no. 12, pp. 4695-4710 
Puri, M., & Zarutskie, R. (2012). On the Life Cycle Dynamics of Venture‐capital‐ and Non‐venture‐capital‐
financed Firms, The Journal of Finance vol. 67, no. 6, pp. 2247-2293 
Rajan, R. G., & Zingales L. (1998). Financial Dependence and Growth. The American Economic Review, 
vol. 88, no. 3, pp. 559-586 
Sahlman, W. A. (1990). The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organizations, Journal of 
Financial Economics, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 473-521 
Samila, S., & Sorenson, O. (2010). Venture Capital as a Catalyst to Commercialization. Research Policy, 
vol. 39 no. 10, pp. 1348-1360 
Samila, S., & Sorenson, O. (2011). Venture Capital, Entrepreneurship, and Economic Growth, The Review 
of Economics and Statistics, vol. 93, no. 1, pp. 338-349 
Sapienza, H. J., Manigart, S., & Vermeir, W. (1996). Venture Capitalist Governance and Value Added in 
Four Countries. Journal of Business Venturing, vol. 11, no. 6, pp. 439-469 
Schertler, A. (2007). Knowledge Capital and Venture Capital Investments: New Evidence from European 
Panel Data, German Economic Review, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 64-88 
Smith, K. (2006). Measuring Innovation in J. Fagerberg & D. C. Mowery, (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Innovation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 149-178 
Tang, M.-C., & Chyi, Y.-L. 2008). Legal Environments, Venture Capital, and Total Factor Productivity 
Growth of Taiwanese Industry. Contemporary Economic Policy, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 468-481 
United States Census Bureau (USCB, 2015). Business Dynamics Statistics. Available Online: 
http://www.census.gov/ces/dataproducts/bds/ [Accessed 11 April 2015] 
World Bank (2015a). World Development Indicators, Available Online: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data [Accessed 13 April 2015] 
39 
World Bank (2015b). Doing Business – Historical Data Sets and Trends Data, Available online: 
http://www.doingbusiness.org [Accessed 7 April 2015] 
Wright, M., Gilligan, J., & Amess, K. (2009). The Economic Impact of Private Equity: What We Know 
and What We Would Like to Know. Venture Capital, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 1-21 
Zhang, B., Zhang, D., Wang, J., & Huang, X. (2013). Does Venture Capital Spur Economic Growth? 
Evidence from Israel, Romanian Journal for Economic Forecasting, vol. 2, pp. 115-128 
Zucker, L. G., Darby, M. R., & Brewer, M. B. (1998). Intellectual Human Capital and the Birth of US 
Biotechnology Enterprises, American Economic Review, vol. 88, no. 1, pp. 290-306
40 
APPENDIX 
A.1 THE STEADY RATE OF BUSINESS CREATION ACCORDING TO MICHELACCI AND SUAREZ (2004) 
The mass of searching monitors 𝑚0𝑡 represents the stock of free informed capital. The first step of the 
derivation is to assume that 𝑚0𝑡 and the rate at which informed capital gets reused, 𝜃𝑞(𝜃) constitutes the 
rate of business creation 𝑛𝑡, thus 𝑛𝑡 = 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝑚0𝑡 where 𝑞(𝜃) is defined as 
𝑞(𝜃) =
ℎ(𝑒, 𝑚)
𝑒
= ℎ (1,
1
𝜃
) 
𝑚1𝑡 is the stock of informed capital in firms in the start-up stage, i. e. in the stage at which a firm does not 
know yet whether it will be successful. At the development stage, is becomes clear whether a firm will be 
successful but no income is generated yet. Capital bound in these firms is described as 𝑚2𝑡 . 𝑚0𝑡  is 
determined by the the total stock of informed capital 𝑀, and the two masses of informed capital bound in 
firms. Thus, the equation 𝑚0𝑡 = 𝑀 − 𝑚1𝑡 − 𝑚2𝑡 has to hold. The change of the masses, ?̇?1𝑡 and ?̇?2𝑡 are 
determined as follows. 
?̇?1𝑡 = 𝑛𝑡 − 𝜆𝑚1𝑡, ?̇?2𝑡 = 𝜆𝛾(1 − 𝑓)𝑚1𝑡 − 𝜇𝑚2𝑡 
Thus, ?̇?1𝑡 depends on the rate of business creation and 𝜆, the exit of firms transferring to the development 
stage. ?̇?2𝑡 is determined by the flow of successful firms that are not going public minus the exits of capital 
bound in firms that transfer to the stage of maturity. For the steady state, setting ?̇?1𝑡 zero, it can be obtained 
𝑚1𝑡 =
𝑛𝑡
𝜆
. Similarly, ?̇?2𝑡 = 0 yields and using 𝑚1𝑡 
𝑚2𝑡 =
𝜆𝛾
𝜇
(1 − 𝑓)𝑚1𝑡 =
𝜆𝛾
𝜇
(1 − 𝑓)
𝑛𝑡
𝜆
 
Both masses of informed capital are used for the equation of 𝑚0𝑡, which results in 
𝑚0𝑡 = 𝑀 −
𝑛𝑡
𝜆
−
𝜆𝛾
𝜇
(1 − 𝑓)
𝑛𝑡
𝜆
 
Solving for 𝑛 using the equation from above yields final the steady state rate of business creation 𝑛 
𝑛 = 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜆𝑚0 =
𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜆𝑀
𝜆 + [1 + (𝜆𝛾 𝜇⁄ )(1 − 𝑓)]𝜃𝑞(𝜃)
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A.2 DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
TABLE 15: OVERVIEW OF USED DATA 
Retrieved data and source Used for variable Country and 
time scope 
Online 
accessible 
Explanation 
Business dynamics from 
Eurostat 
Firm births, 
Employment, Firm 
survival 
European 
countries in 
scope, 
2004 – 2012 
Yes SIC1 Indutries Mining, Construction, Manufacturing, Transportation and Public Utilities, Wholesale Trade, Retail 
Trade, Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate, Services. 
Excluded are Self–employed, Domestic service workers, Railroad employees, Agricultural production workers, 
Most government employees, Employees on ocean–borne vessels, Employees in foreign countries. For detailed 
information see Eurostat and OECD (2007). 
Business dynamics from 
United States Census 
Bureau 
Firm births, 
Employment, 
Firms survival 
United States, 
1977 – 2012 
Yes NACE Rev. 2 industries with codes B to N excluding K642 (activities of holding companies). Thus, firms of the 
agricultural sector were excluded. Firm survival rates were constructed from the data following the Eurostat 
methodology using statistics on firm deaths. 
VC industry from EVCA VC amount, 
Companies 
European 
countries in 
scope, 
2007 – 2013 
Yes Included are about 1200 private equity firms located and investing mainly investing in Europe. According to EVCA 
(2015), “the funds included in the statistics are: private equity funds making direct private equity investments, 
mezzanine private equity funds, co-investment funds, rescue / turnaround funds. The following funds are excluded 
from the statistics: infrastructure funds, real estate funds, distress debt funds, primary funds-of-funds,” secondary 
funds-of-funds. The values are interpolated to the amount of domestic investment by using the value specific ratio 
of domestic investment as given by the statistics on the geographic distribution of investments. Furthermore, the 
statistics were extrapolated to the total market figure by using the estimation of coverage as published by EVCA. 
1989 – 2006 No14 
VC industry from NVCA VC amount, 
Companies 
United States, 
1985 – 2014 
Yes “The report includes the investment activity of professional venture capital firms with or without a US office, SBICs, 
venture arms of corporations, institutions, investment banks and similar entities whose primary activity is financial 
investing. Where there are other participants such as angels, corporations, and governments in a qualified and 
verified financing round the entire amount of the round is included. Qualifying transactions include cash investments 
by these entities either directly or by participation in various forms of private placement. All recipient companies 
are private, and may have been newly-created or spunout of existing companies. The report excludes debt, buyouts, 
recapitalizations, secondary purchases, IPOs, investments in public companies such as PIPES (private investments 
in public entities), investments for which the proceeds are primarily intended for acquisition such as roll-ups, change 
of ownership, and other forms of private equity that do not involve cash such as services-in-kind and venture 
leasing.” (NVCA, 2014, p. 105). The values are only transformed to constant 2005 prices and otherwise not changed 
as no further transformations were seen to be necessary for the United States. 
 
                                                     
14 Data are available on request from EVCA or from the author of the thesis. 
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15 All countries in scope: Austria, Baltic countries as an aggregate, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States 
16 The methodology of the indicator is described online: http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology [Accessed on 14 May 2015] 
TABLE 15: OVERVIEW OF USED DATA 
Retrieved data and source Used for variable Country and 
time scope 
Online 
accessible 
Explanation 
Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation from World 
Bank 
Capital All countries15 Yes “Gross fixed capital formation (formerly gross domestic fixed investment) includes land improvements (fences, 
ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and 
the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. 
According to the 1993 SNA, net acquisitions of valuables are also considered capital formation. Data are in constant 
2005 U.S. dollars.” (World Bank, 2015a) 
Patent Applications from 
World Bank 
Patents All countries Yes “Patent applications are worldwide patent applications filed through the Patent Cooperation Treaty procedure or 
with a national patent office for exclusive rights for an invention--a product or process that provides a new way of 
doing something or offers a new technical solution to a problem. A patent provides protection for the invention to 
the owner of the patent for a limited period, generally 20 years.” (World Bank, 2015a) 
R&D Expenditures from 
Eurostat 
R&D All countries Yes The values were retrieved in 2005 constant prices and transformed to US$. 
Ease of Doing Business 
Indicator from World 
Bank 
Sab All countries Yes Percentage of Distance To Frontier for “Starting a business” indicator16 
Population from World 
Bank 
VC amount, 
Companies, Firm 
births, 
Employment, 
Capital, Patents 
All countries Yes Population statistics are used for transformation to per capita values of VC, patent, gross fixed capital formation and 
business dynamics statistics 
Self-calculated exchange 
rates using data on the 
Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation from World 
Bank 
VC amount All countries 
in scope 
except United 
States 
Yes Exchange rates are used for transformation of the different currencies to US Dollar 
Self-calculated deflator 
using data on the Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation 
from World Bank 
VC amount All countries 
in scope 
Yes Price indices are used for transformation from current to constant prices with the basic year 2005 
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TABLE 16: SUMMARY STATISTICS: MEAN BY COUNTRY FOR 2004 - 201217 
Country 
VC 
amount 
in 
million 
Compa-
nies 
Births 
Employ-
ment 
Survival 
Austria 6.9 9.919 1,140 3,632 0.757 
 (9) (9) (9) (9) (6) 
Baltics 1.4 2.934 2,467 7,727 0.679 
 (9) (9) (6) (2) (3) 
Belgium 18.5 11.33 553.5 1,385 0.761 
 (9) (9) (7) (7) (4) 
Bulgaria 0.3 0.411 2,134 8,721 0.682 
 (5) (5) (9) (9) (5) 
Czech Republic 0.4 0.255 1,103 4,234 0.764 
 (9) (9) (9) (6) (5) 
Denmark 51.6 22.96 741.9 1,284 0.673 
 (9) (9) (4) (4) (1) 
Finland 22.2 33.88 1,253 1,192 0.692 
 (9) (9) (8) (8) (4) 
France 19.9 9.139 475.6 1,422 0.733 
 (9) (9) (9) (9) (5) 
Germany 11.9 11.55 882.2 1,721 0.590 
 (9) (9) (9) (9) (5) 
Hungary 4.2 2.600 2,318 5,923 0.586 
 (9) (9) (9) (9) (5) 
Ireland 14.6 15.42 568.5 1,176 0.677 
 (9) (9) (7) (7) (4) 
Italy 5.9 1.372 892.7 2,256 0.689 
 (9) (9) (9) (9) (5) 
Luxembourg 31.2 6.280 2,340 6,950 0.750 
 (6) (6) (9) (6) (5) 
Netherlands 18.3 11.53 1,066 3,958 0.583 
 (9) (9) (9) (8) (5) 
Norway 44.2 26.01 1,071 2,377 0.669 
 (9) (9) (9) (9) (5) 
Poland 0.5 0.501 936.6 3,345 0.652 
 (9) (9) (9) (9) (5) 
Portugal 9.8 8.022 2,067 5,339 0.675 
 (9) (9) (9) (8) (6) 
Romania 0.7 0.323 1,933 6,361 0.614 
 (5) (5) (9) (9) (5) 
Spain 13.6 5.326 1,485 4,364 0.609 
 (9) (9) (9) (9) (5) 
Sweden 42.9 40.64 1,477 2,975 0.825 
 (9) (9) (9) (9) (5) 
Switzerland 21.1 7.644 921.0 2,023 0.668 
 (9) (9) (9) (9) (1) 
United Kingdom 32.4 10.71 3,440 8,249 0.571 
 (9) (9) (9) (5) (5) 
United States 83.1 5.291 1,526 9,018 0.630 
 (9) (9) (9) (9) (9) 
 
                                                     
17 Number of non-missing values in () 
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TABLE 17: SUMMARY STATISTICS: MEAN BY YEAR18 
Year 
VC amount 
in million 
Companies Births 
Employ-
ment 
Survival 
2004 28.1 16.55 1,491 4,287 0.650 
 (20) (20) (19) (16) (1) 
2005 35.3 15.41 1,477 4,351 0.648 
 (21) (21) (19) (17) (1) 
2006 33 13.15 1,462 4,246 0.640 
 (21) (21) (21) (20) (1) 
2007 19.3 10.44 1,614 4,980 0.701 
 (22) (22) (22) (20) (3) 
2008 21.1 9.511 1,564 4,133 0.686 
 (23) (23) (22) (19) (19) 
2009 12.8 8.913 1,335 3,687 0.695 
 (23) (23) (23) (21) (20) 
2010 12.2 8.726 1,296 3,452 0.659 
 (22) (22) (23) (22) (21) 
2011 12 8.751 1,428 3,802 0.658 
 (22) (22) (23) (23) (21) 
2012 12.3 9.363 1,371 3,579 0.671 
 (22) (22) (22) (20) (21) 
  
                                                     
18 Number of non-missing values in () 
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A.3 RESULTS FOR ALTERNATIVE CONTROLS: R&D EXPENDITURE AND INDICATOR FOR STARTING A 
BUSINESS 
TABLE 18: RESULTS WITH R&D EXPENDITURES INSTEAD OF PATENT APPLICATIONS 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Variable Firm births in t Employment in t 3-year firm survival rate in t+3 
VC am. in t -0.005  0.017  0.009***  
 (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.00)  
Comp. in t  -0.007  0.007  0.013** 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.00) 
Capital in t 0.485*** 0.478*** 0.717*** 0.745*** -0.115*** -0.105*** 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) (0.04) (0.03) 
Capital in t+3     0.012 0.020 
     (0.06) (0.06) 
R&D in t -0.276** -0.272** -0.504** -0.538*** -0.103** -0.103*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.18) (0.18) (0.04) (0.03) 
Obs. 175 175 162 162 100 100 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Table 18 reports the estimates from the FE OLS regression. The dependent variables are firm births, employment and the rate of survival of 
firms born 3 years before. The independent variables of interest are VC amount and Companies. Capital and R&D expenditures are control 
variables. For the regressions, 23 countries and the years from 2004 to 2012 are considered.  
* significance at the 10 % level, ** significance at the 5 % level, *** significance at the 1 % level 
 
TABLE 19: RESULTS WITH STARTING A BUSINESS INDICATOR (SAB) INSTEAD OF PATENT APPLICATIONS 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Variable Firm births in t Employment in t 3-year firm survival rate in t+3 
VC am. in t 0.004  0.025  0.011***  
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.00)  
Comp. in t  0.007  0.022  0.017** 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.01) 
Capital in t 0.440** 0.446** 0.336 0.366 -0.147** -0.133** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.24) (0.24) (0.06) (0.05) 
Capital in t+3     0.060 0.066 
     (0.06) (0.06) 
SAB in t -0.299 -0.305 -0.684 -0.701 -0.103* -0.103* 
 (0.33) (0.35) (0.51) (0.52) (0.06) (0.06) 
Obs. 181 181 168 168 98 98 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Table 19 reports the estimates from the FE OLS regression. The dependent variables are firm births, employment and the rate of survival of 
firms born 3 years before. The independent variables of interest are VC amount and Companies. Capital and starting a business indicator are 
control variables. For the regressions, 23 countries and the years from 2004 to 2012 are considered.  
* significance at the 10 % level, ** significance at the 5 % level, *** significance at the 1 % level 
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A.4 RESULTS FOR ALTERNATIVE TIME STRUCTURE OF THE MODELS ON SURVIVAL RATES 
 
TABLE 21: RESULTS FOR 2-YEAR FIRM SURVIVAL 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
Variable 2-year firm survival rate in t+2 
VC am. in t 0.004  0.004  0.005  0.004  
 (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  
Comp. in t  0.008  0.005  0.009  0.005 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Capital in t   -0.073* -0.065*   -0.071* -0.064* 
   (0.04) (0.04)   (0.04) (0.04) 
Capital in t+2   0.145*** 0.145***   0.137*** 0.137*** 
   (0.04) (0.04)   (0.04) (0.05) 
Patents in t     -0.015 -0.013 -0.011 -0.011 
     (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Obs. 111 111 109 109 110 110 108 108 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Table 21 reports the estimates from the FE OLS regression. The dependent variable is the rate of survival of firms born 2 years before and the 
independent variables of interest are VC amount and Companies. Capital and patents are control variables. For the regressions, 23 countries and 
the years from 2004 to 2012 are considered.  
* significance at the 10 % level, ** significance at the 5 % level, *** significance at the 1 % level 
  
TABLE 20: RESULTS FOR 1-YEAR FIRM SURVIVAL 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
Variable 1-year firm survival rate in t+1 
VC am. in t -0.003  -0.001  -0.003  -0.002  
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Comp. in t  -0.005  -0.001  -0.005  -0.001 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Capital in t   -0.032 -0.037   -0.028 -0.034 
   (0.05) (0.04)   (0.05) (0.04) 
Capital in t+1   0.088* 0.089*   0.082 0.085* 
   (0.05) (0.05)   (0.05) (0.05) 
Patents in t     -0.008 -0.009 -0.004 -0.004 
     (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Obs. 117 117 115 115 117 117 115 115 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Table 20 reports the estimates from the FE OLS regression. The dependent variable is the rate of survival of firms born 1 years before and the 
independent variables of interest are VC amount and Companies. Capital and patents are control variables. For the regressions, 23 countries and 
the years from 2004 to 2012 are considered.  
* significance at the 10 % level, ** significance at the 5 % level, *** significance at the 1 % level 
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A.5 GRAPHS ON VC AMOUNT AND FIRM BIRTHS19 
FIGURE 2: VC AMOUNT BY COUNTRY (OWN GRAPH) 
 
 
FIGURE 3: BOXPLOTS OF LOGARITHMED VC AMOUNT (OWN GRAPH) 
  
                                                     
19 All graphs are own graphs using data as described in part 4 and appendix A.2. All four graphs illustrate all 23 countries in 
scope and for the years of 2004 – 2012. 
(Average of 2004 – 2012) 
 
(2004 – 2012) 
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FIGURE 4: FIRM BIRTHS BY COUNTRY (OWN GRAPH) 
 
 
FIGURE 5: BOXPLOTS OF LOGARITHMED FIRM BIRTHS BY COUNTRY (OWN GRAPH) 
 
  
(Average of 2004 – 2012) 
 
(2004 – 2012) 
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A.6 RESULTS FOR THE FIRST STAGE OF THE 2SLS REGRESSIONS 
TABLE 22: RESULTS FOR THE FIRST STAGE OF THE 2SLS REGRESSION OF FIRM BIRTHS 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
Variable Firm births in t-1 
Births in t-2 0.653*** 0.628*** 0.604*** 0.598*** 0.620*** 0.594*** 0.566*** 0.556*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
VC am. in t 0.03***  0.015  0.032***  0.020*  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Comp. in t  0.048**  0.0341*  0.054**  0.042** 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Capital in t   0.382*** 0.413***   0.400*** 0.0443*** 
   (0.11) (0.10)   (0.11) (0.10) 
Patents t     -0.028 -0.023 -0.046 -0.043 
     (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Obs. 144 144 142 142 143 143 141 141 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Table 22 reports the estimates from first stage of the 2SLS regression of firm births with fixed effects. For the regressions, 23 countries and the 
years from 2004 to 2012 are considered. 
* significance at the 10 % level, ** significance at the 5 % level, *** significance at the 1 % level 
 
TABLE 23: RESULTS FOR THE FIRST STAGE OF THE 2SLS REGRESSION OF EMPLOYMENT 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
Variable Empoyment in t-1 
Empl. in t-2 0.438*** 0.410*** 0.414*** 0.377*** 0.415*** 0.387*** 0.433*** 0.433*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
VC am. in t 0.055***  0.050***  0.058***  0.050***  
 (0.018)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Comp. in t  0.099***  0.102***  0.103***  0.081*** 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Capital in t   0.311* 0.413**   0.649*** 0.769*** 
   (0.19) (0.18)   (0.15) (0.15) 
Patents t     -0.018 -0,029 -0.025 -0.045 
     (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Obs. 120 120 120 120 119 119 119 119 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Table 23 reports the estimates from first stage of the 2SLS regression of employment with fixed effects. For the regressions, 22 countries and 
the years from 2004 to 2012 are considered. 
* significance at the 10 % level, ** significance at the 5 % level, *** significance at the 1 % level 
 
